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ABSTRACT

The Middle East decision making game has been developed to provide college level political science students with some indication of the complexities of international political situations. The central issue examined in the game is the way in which perceptions of a conflict relate to foreign policy decision. The game is divided into two sections. In the first section, students are directed to study historical data and policy statements relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some data is presented in the document, along with analysis exercises and simple statistical and computer assignments, and some data is gathered through library research. Major topics which students are to analyze include complexities facing decision-makers, military variables in the Middle East situation, the role of the United Nations, interest group attitudes, the Middle East Policy, Zionism, Palestinian refugees, the Suez Canal, and oil. Section one can be utilized as a self-contained module without the role-playing exercise. Section two describes and presents rules and regulations for the Middle East role-play exercise. Students are assigned positions on a game team (an Arab nation, the United States, the United Nations, the Press) and are asked to write a policy paper which is received and responded to by other teams. Policy papers, called game moves, deal with topics such as formation of military alliances, foreign aid agreements, and mobilization of military forces. Forms for recording game moves, identifying issues emphasized in the game, and evaluating the game are included. (Author/DB)

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SETUPS

SUPPLEMENTARY EMPIRICAL TEACHING UNITS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Decision-Making Game

by

Karen Ann Feste

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SETUPS
Cross-National and World Politics
Revised Edition, 1977

SO 010 643

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Decision-Making Game

Developed by
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The American Political Science Association
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The Workshop Project was administered by the Association's Division of Educational Affairs. The Workshop implemented a recommendation by the Task Force on Computer Related Instruction and approved by the Steering Committee on Undergraduate Education, to the effect that support should be sought to facilitate the development of learning materials that involve political science students actively in inquiry.

Test editions of SETUPS were prepared by the faculty participating in the Workshop. Each SETUPS was reviewed by at least three qualified persons and tested in at least six classes. These evaluations were used by the authors and the editor in revising the modules.

The revised editions of SETUPS are published under the auspices of the Division of Educational Affairs. However, the views expressed are those of the authors and not of the Division of Educational Affairs or of the American Political Science Association.

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FOREWORD

SETUPS: American Politics launched the Association's effort to provide innovative instructional materials on recent research topics. In the preface to the revised editions of these SETUPS, published in 1975, we expressed the hope that students and teachers would find the materials useful. And many do: twenty thousand SETUPS have been ordered for classes in over two hundred universities and colleges in the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe.

Hence, it is with great satisfaction that we introduce a second series of SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics, for courses in comparative politics, international politics and methodology. The SETUPS in this series were prepared in the summer of 1975 by political scientists at a College Faculty Workshop, supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation and hosted by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. We are indebted to the Consortium on several counts: Their rich archive is the source of most SETUPS data; their talented and industrious staff assisted SETUPS authors and continues to prepare and distribute the datasets with great dispatch.

Now we would encourage faculty working at their own institutions to continue to develop SETUPS units that can be field tested, reviewed and revised for general class use.

Evron M. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director
American Political Science Association
May, 1977

EDITOR'S PREFACE

SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics represents, in one sense, variation on a highly successful theme. The College Faculty Workshop, held in Ann Arbor in the summer of 1975, was consciously directed toward use of the *SETUPS: American Politics* as a model. A year's experience with the testing and evaluation of the first series had provided Sheila Koeppen Mann, APSA project director, and Catherine Kelleher, workshop director from ICPSR, with a clear set of benchmarks in terms of style, format, and level of difficulty. Some of the key people were the same, most especially, the senior workshop consultants, William Buchanan of Washington and Lee University and Betty A. Nesvold, San Diego State University, who had been workshop directors for the first series. The technical support staff of the ICPSR were by then seasoned veterans in both the design and dissemination of data components for instructional purposes.

In other ways, however, the Cross-National and World Politics series involves some significant, even radical departures. The first is a variation of focus within the series. While the majority of volumes are still primarily intended for the introductory level, all strive for greater breadth and adaptability. Some are even specifically designed for upper-division students with at least some background in political analysis. Second, the evaluations of the American series revealed a felt need (most often among instructors in small schools or with very large classes) for more varied, flexible approaches to data analysis. Accordingly, a number of the volumes stress modes of analysis which, though quantitative, do not necessarily require computer use. A third shift is the direct incorporation in the text of numerous suggestions for further research. This is aimed not only towards stimulating the advanced student but also to emphasize the different types of questions which can be addressed to the same data base, and the chance to extend the data base to permit more rigorous testing and exploration.

Perhaps the most striking innovations, however, come in the creative responses of the workshop participants to the central dilemma of all cross-national analysis: the question of comparability across time and space. Every author had to wrestle with the problem of defining similar events; most worried long and hard about parallel indicators or congruent questions. A number found themselves engaged in a considerable amount of original research; working with the ICPSR staff to develop new data sets or drawing on unpublished research,

their own or that of generous fellow scholars. Still others faced the relatively novel challenge of including the United States as a country for comparison. In all, it was a learning experience for all the workshop participants, one which has implicitly enriched the materials for student use, but also has provided new insights for the field as a whole.

With the publication of *SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics* the SETUPS model now seems well launched. Individual teachers and researchers now have a variety of examples to guide their development of new instructional materials, either for their own use or for eventual distribution under the continuing APSA program. It would now seem appropriate to consider what other modes of instructional materials can be designed to meet the standards embodied in SETUPS series. There may be simpler approaches—as in data sets, instructional decks, research design exercise; there may be more complex structures—as integrated courses, linked modules, or more comprehensive networks combining materials development, instructor training, and student peer group diffusion. But all must serve the goal the SETUPS series have established: an introduction for undergraduate students to the conduct of research, to critical thinking about the relationship between evidence and inference, at the highest level of professional and instructional excellence.

Our personal debts in the implementation of the SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics are many. Our appreciation must go first to the workshop participants, all committed to the best in undergraduate teaching, and to the production of innovative materials on an impossible timetable. They are: Herb Asher, Ohio State; Donald Borock, Gettysburg College; John Campbell, University of Michigan; Terry Dungworth, Michigan State University; James Dyer, Texas A&M University; John Echols, University of Michigan; Lee Fennell, University of the Pacific; Karen A. Feste, University of Denver; Robert Harmel, Northwestern University; Roger Harrell, California State University at Northridge; William Klecka, University of Cincinnati; Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Governor's State University; Daniel Nelson, Franklin and Marshall College; Bradley Richardson, Ohio State University; Jay Stevens, California State University at Long Beach; and Charles Taylor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Our appreciation, too, to the SETUPS support staff: Valerie Bunce, Karen Carty, Gretchen Fei, and John Stuckey, all of the University of Michigan. Thanks of special note to the ICPSR staff, particularly Eric Austin, Robert Beattie, Carolyn Geda, and Henry Heitoweit. Last, but hardly least, are two without whom *SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics* would not have been possible: Buck Buchanan, comrade in arms, and Sheilah Koeppen Mann, project director extraordinaire.

Catherine M. Kelleher, Michigan
Betty A. Nesvold, San Diego State
Editors

INTRODUCTION

Studying Arab-Israeli relations provides an intriguing, fascinating introduction to international politics. Historical circumstances, policy commitments through time, entangling complexity in the issues that mark the conflict picture, all combine into currently held positions and the emotionally charged views often expressed by interested parties. A central question examined in the module is how perceptions link up to foreign policy decisions. It is quite appropriate, therefore, to select a politically provocative, delicate issue for analysis.

This booklet provides information about conflict. It contains a highly condensed version of major issues and events. Materials of historical background and argument that minimize bias favoring any side, are tough to present. Events have to be described in neutral, non-offensive language; descriptions that communicate information about what happened and indicate the positions of disputing states, is demanded. This is a recognized, tricky problem in international politics. An awareness of such difficulties does not excuse entirely possible bias existing in the analysis contained here. Since language and meaning are subject to interpretation, which in turn is influenced, to some extent, by predisposition or perception, the problem of bias has no objectively determined solution. Anyway, there may be no bias-free positions left in this dispute.

Writing an impartial background sketch to the Arab-Israeli conflict was the author's task; knowing *why* that was difficult, by appreciating the way perceptions enter into analysis of events, is the student's responsibility. Various module assignments are directed towards this problem. Materials in this module focus on different ways to gather and analyze information about foreign policy choices. An ambitious goal guided construction of the exercises overall: that students understand influences placed on decision-makers.

Showing how cognitive and emotional components enter into policy discussions, decisions and subsequent analysis, the complete set of assignments suggested divide into two separate sections. The first part of this booklet includes an exercise in studying event data, requiring computer access; others necessitate library research, and a few simple statistical calculations. Section two emphasizes learning by participation, in a role-play exercise called the Middle East Game.

While threads of continuity link the exercise together in formated, sequential order, it is not essential that they all be completed. The introduction to event

data analysis presented in the first exercise could surely stand alone. Due to data handling complexities—processing materials and interpreting output—more time is needed to cover this assignment adequately (about 3 hours). Some exercises are self-contained in the module, requiring only simple computations before interpreting the information. If the role-play exercise is used, then one assignment where library research is critical will need to be made. It is Exercise 5, involving creation of Policy Statements reflecting issue positions argued by parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The entire first set of exercises, from event analysis to policy statements, focusing on information gathering and policy creation *could* be completed in a week's time, but it is wise to separate these assignments from the onset of game play by several days so the policy papers may be read and evaluated with regard to their representativeness of the specific country positions. These should be returned to students and, if necessary, revised and evaluated again before beginning the game.

If the Middle East Game will be played, some time and space considerations are important. At least *one hour* should be spent describing rules and general procedures several weeks before the game starts. Students should be assigned to country and non-nation teams at this point.

This game requires a *minimum* of 18 players and a Director. The teams, and respective number of players, in this arrangement are: Israel—2, Egypt—2, Jordan—2, Syria—2, Palestinians—2, United States—2, Soviet Union—2, United Nations—1, ROW—1, Press—2. Eliminating teams or trimming their membership beyond this point seemingly affects the game's operation and potential as a learning tool. The game is already an oversimplified, crude model of the chaotic complexity defining interrelationships among Middle Eastern nations. Up to 60 players (perhaps more) can be assigned to various teams in a game keeping the operation manageable. Larger groups should be split with several games forming. Each would include the minimum team structure noted above.

The game rules stipulate 4-10 move sessions, each spanning at least 30 minutes. Some time will also be needed to separate the playing periods. Arrangements for scheduling game play differ; continual activity through a long weekend (or a very long night), when moves are separated by 15-20 minute breaks, is one alternative; using classtime for game action divides the moves another way. As a general guideline, more time per move period will be needed when fewer sessions are incorporated.

Whenever possible, small group laboratories—where participants are physically separated into teams—provide the ideal setting for playing the game. Alternative arrangements include cafeterias, or very large lecture halls assuring the privacy and separation of the groups of country decision-makers. Location of the teams may be identified by a placecard labeling the groups. The Press should be headquartered near the Control Center since it receives a fair amount of information about country moves from Control.

Arrangements for reproducing the daily newspapers should be made in advance. A simple system is for students to type the papers on ditto masters and have copies made prior to class time. One copy per team is usually sufficient. Players can pick up a copy of the daily paper as they enter the political gaming

room during each playing period, so it is wise to arrive a little before class time.

Evaluating the module may be handled in two ways: by having students complete questions in Exercise 7, and subsequently holding a debriefing session during a class period. Several theories about the pedagogical effects of using a gaming-simulation method have been advanced, yet information on its effectiveness as an instructional technique is incomplete.

One possible way to evaluate games is by surveying the participants about the simulation model itself. Questions concerning the match between simulate and referent world structures, processes and results (including consequences) can be posed, where the respondent is encouraged to illustrate both the adequacy and inadequacy of the correspondence. Further, players may be asked to explore the connections between different structures in each environment and explain why they lead to differing processes and hence different outcomes in decisions. To that end, a set of open-ended questions might be raised in the following areas:

1. In what sense was the game realistic—in structure, processes, results?
2. Where did the game diverge from reality? How and why?
3. What information about the reality is provided in the game that was not fully recognized prior to the simulation experience?
4. How might game consequences of decisions be compared with referent world consequences? If the game failed in simulating repercussions of bad and good decisions, how might this be corrected in the structure and operating rules of the game?
5. What special operations of the game (mathematical manipulations, for example) seemed necessary to the simulation operation, but were unrelated to referent world activities?

The point of each of these questions is to force the participant to place the simulation experience in context with the subjective reality in which s/he operates. If there are aspects of the reality that are completely ignored in the simulations—can these be incorporated?

In probing each of these areas, players may comment on the *activity of the game itself* (the kinds of activity occurring, decision-making, coalition formation, influence relationships, operating perceptions), the *mechanisms of game play* (operating rules which worked effectively, those that hindered strategies, the extent of realism generated by the particular composition of rules) the *nature of realism* in the game (a discussion of analogy with the referent world—usually different views of the referent world are presented, which is often a revelation to the game participants), and finally, *specific learning* that may have occurred as a result of the simulation experience (whether the simulation taught the players anything about the nature of decision-making, the handling of crisis, the future outlook for conflict resolution).

The idea behind all of these probing areas is to draw out points about reality that are non-obvious to the participants, and to get players to generalize about their behavior principles that operated in the game environment and transfer that to the referent world. With the proper kinds of instruments and sufficient

time, the evaluation and debriefing periods can be the most profitable part of the simulation experience. No doubt there are many different ways for introducing simulation, explaining its function and examining problems of reality-testing; here is one pattern:

1. In preparing players for a simulation game, define the function of a simulation in general, and define it for the purposes at hand. Indicate player expectations in terms of the game context (i.e., winning, maximizing, etc.) and for the overall learning expected.
2. Immediately at the game's end, have players complete a questionnaire (which includes items in the above mentioned areas of analysis).
3. Hold a debriefing session (1-2 hours) that covers questionnaire items and probes the reality and function of the simulation; who played well, who played poorly and why.
4. Draw some conclusions about the experience that players may relate to the real world.

Obviously there are points to be made about overall impact of a simulation on the players—what do they integrate to their referent world environment that they picked up in the game? How long lasting is the simulation set of memories and acquired knowledge? What are the ultimate attitudinal effects? Attitudinal research outside of the simulation context has been unsuccessful in answering these pressing questions, and gaming-simulation research has not developed to a point where any conclusions may be drawn.

Participants in numerous test runs of the Middle East Game have responded quite favorably to the experience. Some important factors emerged for predicting success, including game set-up, playing time and evaluation components. These have been described above because they are vital, critical features affecting the classroom learning environment.

DECISION-MAKING

This exercise is designed to introduce some of the complexities facing decision-makers when they formulate national policy. Analyzing the policy process is an arduous, difficult task, and requires that some initial choices be made. A substantive focus must be selected from a wide range of problems that concern governments today; elements to be explained through a policy examination need to be isolated; and a perspective of analysis appropriate for handling a given problem has to be chosen.

An aspect quite important to policy-making concerns the attitudes, perceptions and predispositions of those responsible for governmental choices. A number of factors may affect an individual's position on an issue as information is evaluated and various choices of action are considered. Information acquisition and its subsequent analysis contains both objective and subjective or judgmental components. Objectively, decision-makers search for patterns that define basic "facts" of the situation. Interpretation will depend in part, however, on values, prejudices, sympathies, preconceptions, expectations and goals held by individual policy-makers. Knowing and appreciating the way these intangible features are woven into policy questions is an important prerequisite to evaluating problems and their consequences from the point of view of constructing solutions, or at the very least, forecasting future events.

In this module you will become acquainted with decision-making components in the international environment of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a situation where policy formation in any nation is sensitive to policies and actions of others within the regional subsystem. Conflicting policies continually come into play between central actors on a number of substantive issues. Yet, no fundamental agreement plan has been formulated and worked out among the participants. Why? The issues and constraints confronting the governments of these nations provide the key to understanding positions held by the disputing states and to some extent, these aspects turn on decision-maker perceptions of the broader conflict picture.

In order to accomplish the dual objectives: understanding the impact of perceptions on foreign policy choices and learning about decision-making complexities among nations involved in fundamental conflict, several paths of inquiry are suggested. A key concept in this process is information management. Information may be power, if used correctly. The general uncertainty in

international politics is linked to the insecurity nations have with respect to activities that may be undertaken by their opponents, given basic information about national policy. It is a truism that greater amounts of knowledge about enemy states will allow a government an edge towards predicting its own future, thereby making possible adjustments to insure security, even (if not always) at the expense of the opposite side. Manipulating information to achieve a desired effect among a state's enemies, or sometime more broadly, to influence world public opinion, is another often useful way to exert control on the environment and protect national policy.

How do decision-makers put together and use information they acquire? In the Middle East context chosen here, information activities are divided into sections designed to show various ways to interpret materials. As a first step, gathering some background information about the specific countries in the Middle East will be useful. A brief chronology of events characterizing the conflict, a summary and analysis of major issues and statistics on country attributes, particularly military variables, are presented in this booklet. Second, understanding present policies of the governments will be accomplished by having you create strategy statements that reflect current positions of national decision-makers. The background information contained here will assist you in formulating these policies, but additional readings will probably be necessary. A bibliography of relevant materials is given at the end of the module. Finally, to get a sense of how different and often conflicting policies among these governments are intertwined into political realities, a role-playing exercise, the Middle East Game, that enables you to take on the positions of the countries has been incorporated.

The Middle East Game is an operating model of the political aspects surrounding the Arab-Israeli dispute. The game consists of a simplified representation of a group of nations that includes Israel, several Arab states, and the great powers. In addition, the United Nations, the rest of the world (ROW) and the Press are constituted as game components. You will be assigned by your instructor to a decision-making position—either as Head of State, Foreign Policy Negotiator, or Press Secretary—in one of these countries, or designated as a member of the non-nation group teams (UN, ROW or Press). Primary activity of the game concerns the enactment of policies of the respective parties, and national teams may engage in a variety of political actions such as forming coalitions, waging war or negotiating peaceful settlements on specific problems like their counterparts do in the real international community, in an attempt to achieve the objectives specified by the governmental policy leaders.

Because decision-maker perceptions—an important human element in policy formation—have been isolated for examination, role playing activity rather than a machine-interactive simulation is probably more appropriate. It is not the intent here to develop a vehicle whereby events of the Arab-Israeli conflict are foretold, nor to show precisely how governments are constrained by the interaction of say, politics and the economy. Rather, it is hoped that you acquire a richer sense of the complex and often confusing picture facing

governmental leaders and understand how some psychological factors may guide or determine policy choices.

It is important that the game be played as realistically as possible. Acquiring background information about the Middle Eastern countries and dimensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict will help you to understand the issues and the positions which define the present political situation. Because you will act out individual decision-making roles with the explicit function of carrying through policy positions that are consonant with the respective country you are chosen to represent, it is important to gain information about capabilities, constraints and objectives for that nation, and also to understand the policy aspirations and capability profiles of other countries. Participants will be evaluated in the game on their sense of knowledge and sense of realism and on their ingenuity in manipulating the international or domestic environment.

In preparation for this experience in political decision-making, various aspects of the policy process itself and the kinds of considerations facing governmental leaders as they formulate national policy will be discussed. The module is then subdivided into sections that represent sequential steps in the policy process to give you an idea of the specific problems decision-makers address at different points in this process.

Reduced to its most abstract components, the policy process involves a series of steps that includes specification of objectives, an assessment of national capabilities to evaluate the likelihood of achieving goals, a set of strategies outlining how the policy will be put into effect, and speculation about anticipated consequences. Creating policy is often a tremendously difficult task. While governmental leaders may have a clear sense of national priorities and objectives, various factors related to goal achievement constrain the decision-makers from setting policy that is directly and simply related to national goals. Limited capabilities—economically, militarily, politically—frequently prevent nations from achieving policy goals or even from pursuing some goals at all. Conflicting objectives among different policy-makers may also lead to policy failure as may the inability to devise clever strategies or the lack of domestic political support.

Policy choice, as any number of national decision-makers have observed, is no guarantee of policy enactment. Therefore it is nearly always necessary to formulate policies that represent compromises or trade-offs, real or anticipated. Goals may also have to be restructured in order to maximize the likely achievement of at least some of the national priorities defined and perceived by the policy leaders.

In the most rational of worlds, an occasion for policy formation—that is, a point at which governmental leaders perceive a need to create or to revise policy on a given problem—should automatically set in motion a number of discrete steps. First, the problem situation is defined and relevant goals for the parties involved are specified. Those responsible for policy gather information and evaluate it in order to: (1) learn as much as possible about the positions taken by other interested parties and (2) make various capability assessments which help predict the likelihood of success for each participant. Generally decision-makers

believe that the more information they have the better their assessment of the situation and therefore the better their choices on policy matters. For them, the best choice in this context means one that maximizes goal achievement given limited capabilities.

Next, policy alternatives are developed with each being evaluated in terms of the national objectives and abilities to achieve it. A course of action is then selected as the best or the "least worst" policy choice; decision-makers may even adopt a so-called minimax choice, one in which a less-preferred alternative is sought in order to reduce the risk of failure. Attention then turns to the strategy needed to actually enact the policy and to anticipate any consequences which may result. Once a chosen policy has been put into effect, governmental leaders monitor its implementation to gain a clearer picture about its linkage to actual goal achievement. If it is deemed successful or as still having a hope of success, it will most probably be continued, otherwise revision and reformulation may be necessary and the search for information and alternatives would be conducted anew.

What else is involved when national policy is formulated? We will consider very briefly several additional perspectives that introduce more complex dimensions to the procedures.

When formulating policy, governmental decision-makers are concerned with designing the best or most appropriate policy in dealing with national problems. A single best policy may be identified in one way if the major concern of policy-makers is on the external effect of the policy (as the possible reactions from other nations or the international community at large) and in quite another, if the paramount interest is with the domestic internal situation of their own country. Almost every decision of course, takes both internal and external factors into account, but there is still the matter of connecting these aspects together into a coherent, if not balanced framework. It is not unusual that important goals highlighted in the internal perspective may be in conflict with the external objectives, and may have unfortunate implications for the latter.

What are some of these internal factors that affect the policy process? A minimum set of questions posed within an internally-focused framework would be: What are the effects on the economic capability of a nation? How are various interest groups in the society likely to react? Are these groups identified by class, ranging from the rich to the poor or by economic sector, as in the case of industrialists versus functionaries versus farmers, or divided by religious or ethnic categories? Whatever their identification, their primary concerns may be in direct opposition to one another, and it is often the shrewd politician who is capable of forming choices that hinge on a delicate balance in which no group is severely alienated. Often the political structure of a government and society may affect the way internal considerations are brought into focus. If the society is ruled democratically, the controlling powers may not want opposition to their position such that they might be ousted from the government. Various ideological stances reflected in the policy serve to some extent to define the disparity and competition among political groups. Parties identifying with the "right wing" of a country's thinking on policy matters may be hardline on

particular issues they consider important. A "liberal" contingent may clash with the right on some policy problems, as well as defining for itself a set of crucial issues facing the government.

Non-democratically run states, such as autocracies where either a single individual or a small group of elites is responsible for most policy choices, confront another set of problems for internal consideration. In the case of a single ruler, maintaining popular support and restraining opposition developments either in the form of national revolutions or attempted takeovers by another leader are important. This may mean that a country has to be governed in a particular way, with suppression of various movements to allow the single ruler to retain the position of power. Small groups of governmental elites or a single ruler may also be challenged by the military organization of a country. In certain nations the military establishment may represent the greatest degree of leadership, with strictly ordered, disciplined membership. This enables it to rise to high positions of governance on occasion, and military takeovers are not infrequent in developing societies.

The externally-focused framework looks at another set of considerations brought to mind as decision-makers select policy. If a given policy is implemented, how are a state's allies likely to react? Will support be forthcoming? What about enemy actions? Will retaliations occur? Will the country be capable of withstanding such action? To what extent does the policy mesh with the goals of other states? Or, does it clash directly with major objectives of enemy nations? If there is a clash of objectives, will identified enemy states react with hostility on an economic plane, such as embargos on needed goods, or make public proclamations denouncing one's action, which risks a nation's image in world public opinion, or will they respond militarily?

In calculating the possible reactions to policy, governmental decision-makers must also consider their own capabilities in meeting hostile actions. Obviously policy leaders prefer to achieve their objectives rather than be defeated by enemy retaliations, and there must be a stock-taking of a country's ability to tolerate these actions. Primarily, the economic and military capabilities of the nation must be taken into account, as well as the network of foreign assistance on which a country may depend. Knowing how the enemies have responded in the past also provides an important clue for assessing external consequences.

Clearly a quite different policy formation process is involved if decision-makers cannot decide upon a single, presumably best policy choice to be enacted. The criteria for a "best choice" may be different, given various divergent points of view among the policy-makers. The aim will be for the "optimal" solution—that is, an outcome where the nation may be better off as a result of policy implementation with minimal opposition coming from domestic interest groups and hostile nations surrounding the country. But this is usually the most difficult result to achieve or even to predict.

A substitute measure for evaluating decisions may be one known as "satisficing." A satisficing solution means decision-makers examine policy alternatives until they find one that is "good enough"—on whatever terms have already been identified as appropriate for evaluating policy consequences.

Policy-makers may not agree that an action is adequate, even if it is not the first choice of any one policy-maker, and select it because of time constraints. They thus reduce at least their "opportunity costs"—the disadvantages involved in continuing to devote attention to one problem and thus postponing other equally significant, complex decision-making issues. Or it may be that everyone, from the most right wing to the most liberal, can also accept the policy as "adequate."

Yet another mode for selecting one policy over another is known as the "minimum common denominator" method. Here, the differing views held by decision-makers may be so far apart that no policy can be optimal or even satisficing, given the varying criteria for evaluation by the different parties. The only point on which they can agree, or the area of policy that no one strongly objects to, is known as the "minimum common denominator." It is often the decision to do nothing or not to decide.

There are various trade-offs for decision-makers regardless of what policy is chosen or on what basis it is selected. Priority given to internal matters when evaluating policy consequences may lead to a decision that provokes disastrous consequences in the external setting of the policy. This is to say, some decisions may be very good for the nation, domestically, yet for the other nations affected either as allies or enemies, the policy may prove to be an unfortunate choice. Once a policy has been chosen, an appropriate course of action—the series of strategic moves to enact the decision—is outlined. The direct relationship between stated objectives and ability to enact policy now come into play. Policy implementing depends on national capabilities, and often times on the support advanced by other countries.

THE MIDDLE EAST POLICY CONTEXT

Many considerations continually face the governments in the Middle Eastern nations as they try to deal with the long-existing set of problems between them. Many solutions have been suggested by the policy-makers of these countries, by negotiators such as Gunnar Jarring (UN) and Henry Kissinger, and by Commissions of the United Nations. Resolutions have passed in the General Assembly indicating a viewpoint on the situation, and scholars, too, have addressed themselves to the basic question: What next in the Middle East?

These solution types are interesting because they point to contradictory policies suggested for the nations involved. For example, some analysts feel the Israelis should compromise and relinquish occupied lands, while others believe they should hold the land until it can be used as a bargaining point in negotiations with the Arabs. With regard to the Palestinian question there are those who believe the various guerilla attacks against Israel should continue, since they have been effective in forcing world public opinion to form around the basic issues. Others are of the opinion that such actions at this point may only affect public opinion negatively. In the international community at large, some states assert that the Middle East situation will be solved only if major powers—particularly the USA and the USSR—are not directly involved in solution efforts. Others, including specifically the United States, are firmly convinced that resolution of the conflict will not be forthcoming in the absence of major power assistance.

Some of the long run implications for the Middle East political problems have been assessed by Edward Azar. By the 1980's he imagines that the following situations may be evolving:[1]

1. The great powers, especially the West and Japan, will face a scarcity of energy and rare metals and try to acquire these resources from all parts of the globe, including the Arab states; they thus might evolve some accommodation with the Arab states at Israel's expense.
2. Israeli nuclear capabilities will have reached such a high level of sophistication that they can destroy major Arab cities and all Arab

[1] Edward E. Azar, *Probe for Peace: Small State Hostilities*, Minneapolis: Burgess, 1973, p. 78.

military and strategic installations (including oil) efficiently and effectively.

3. The Soviet Union and the United States will agree and publicly declare that they will not get into a nuclear war in order to save any of the parties in the Middle East at any cost.
4. Most of the regimes in the Arab world, including the monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, will have experienced major domestic uprisings resulting in governments whose policies are more supportive of a newly unified guerilla movement dead-set on initiating bold anti-Israeli activities regionally and around the world.
5. The world community (exemplified by the United Nations and its agencies) will have proved itself ineffective in settling regional conflicts, particularly the Arab-Israeli one.
6. An increase in the size and demographic properties of the populations of the region might lead to (a) greater demands for more goods and services accompanied by increasing ecological imbalances and reduced resources and (b) greater need for effective governmental skills in resolving these complex issues. These pressing needs could precipitate further domestic upheavals, increased domestic coercive behavior, and greater imbalances due to curtailment of governmental military expenditures.

Azar suggests that these conditions may lead to several alternatives. First he postulates that the small states of the Middle East will prepare for and engage in more costly wars. Second, that these states will continue the present frustrating state of affairs consisting of sporadic violent border incidents and material and psychological damage. Finally, he views the possibility of Middle Eastern states becoming "neo-colonies" of the Great Powers, with more economic and military dependence on them.

Are the parties in the Middle East conflicts concerned about establishing a peaceful resolution of their disagreements? The Arabs believe that as time goes by they will become more developed militarily and economically and will become more united in their ways. This will enable them to confront Israel and to achieve some of their desired objectives. Israel meanwhile anticipates a decline in Arab-Soviet relations, and would like to see a defeat of the Palestinian liberation movement. The gathering of military power continues on both sides, complicating the nature of the potential peaceful settlement.

Conflicts have occurred between the Jews and surrounding Arab states in the Middle East for sometime. When the state of Israel was formally created on May 15, 1948, as a homeland for Jews, it only served to intensify hostile relations of the disputants. There have been four major wars since 1948. Essentially political problems now have military and economic ramifications and no one has been able to effect a stable, long term solution. Temporary settlements have been difficult and unsatisfactory for the conflicting parties. At various points major powers in the international system, including the United Nations, have played a

major role in attempting negotiable arrangements on a number of problems.

Policy-makers in many nations are concerned with the Middle East situation because of consequences that may result if the parties embark on particular courses of action. The hostility defining the relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbors is intense, and it is the prediction of many analysts that renewed conflict among the participants is more likely to occur before any acceptable compromises can be established. The conflict has far reaching effects, among them whether countries presently relying on substantial oil exports from the Arab nations will be able to sustain their economies. And, there is the probability that one of the parties may acquire and use nuclear weaponry as a threat, a bargaining point, or even as a means for ending the conflict.

Tracing the conflict back to its origins involves a set of historical circumstances. We cannot pinpoint when the dispute actually began, but certainly it gained momentum shortly after World War II when the United Nations passed a resolution that would partition the disputed geographic area into the states of Israel and Palestine. Both Jewish and Palestinian communities had been developing continually in the interwar period. Once the Nazi campaign to exterminate the Jews began, many left Europe and fled to present-day Israel, because Jewish settlement had already been established there, because a vigorous World Zionist Organization was assisting in the movement, and perhaps because the victor nations in the war vacillated on the matter of accepting massive Jewish immigration.

One of the first great problems faced by the newly-formed United Nations at the end of the war was to find some internationally acceptable solution to the developing Arab-Israeli conflict. The recommendation put forth was a partition plan that called for the creation of separate Jewish and Arab states. This plan was subsequently accepted by a two-thirds vote of the UN members in 1947. The Jewish community in Palestine accepted the plan, the Arab community and the Arab states did not. From this time until 1949, fighting continued between Israel and the Arab states including Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq. At the time of the armistice, Israeli forces occupied areas of northern and southern Palestine that had been assigned to Arab control under the UN partition plan. Israel, in fact, wound up holding one-third more territory than it would have held had the partition arrangements been enacted.

The defeated Arabs still did not accept the existence of the Jewish state and Israel, by its actions, was unable to persuade the Arabs to change their attitude. The Palestinian Arabs, for their part, had been forced to give up much of their land to the Jewish community—either through battle or by the dictates of the United Nations.

The end of this first round of battle led to some of the current problems. A large number of Palestinians fled their homes because of the fighting, creating a sizable refugee population in the area. Jerusalem, a major city of the region, which under the UN arrangement was to have an international administration, was now jointly occupied by Jordanian and Israeli forces. The de facto border lines were carefully guarded by parties of both sides. And no Palestinian state existed.

Three additional battles have been fought, involving direct military confrontation. These conflicts have come to be known as the Suez War of 1956, the "June War" or "Six Day War" of 1967, and the war of 1973, referred to by Arabs as the "October War" or "Ramadan War," while Israelis call it the "Yom Kippur War." (It has also been known as such in the United States.) Each successive military encounter served to solidify the positions held by the opposing sides in the conflict, making solutions more difficult, and more complex, but nonetheless, very important to the stability of the region and also critical for the larger international system.

How do policy-makers of the disputing nations deal with these issues? What considerations come to mind as alternatives are formulated and positions adopted? What are the primary national objectives brought into focus by decision-makers of these states as they plan strategies to promote various policies? Is there a framework of decisional processes and goal achievement tactics underlying their approach? What kinds of proposals seem to be more acceptable and why?

In considering some of these issues we shall look at a few components of the countries—principally dimensions of the military establishment (spending patterns and troop size) and the events that have occurred in the relations among the disputing parties. At a later point you will have the opportunity to compose strategy statements representing views of the different states and attempt to activate these plans in a simplified re-creation of Middle East politics through a role playing exercise.

To provide a greater understanding of the issues involved in the Middle East conflict, a brief chronology of events will be presented. We shall also consider some of the major issues and respective positions on these points for the parties involved.

The first war between the Israelis and the Arabs ended in 1949, when various armistice agreements were consummated separately between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria. (Iraq, a participant in the conflict, withdrew forces but never signed an agreement.) Israel was left with more territory than had been originally allocated in the UN partition plan. Moreover, there was no Palestinian state. Israeli land borders adjoined with hostile countries—Syria in the northeast, Jordan to the east, and Egypt in the south. Israel perceived itself to be in a weak geo-strategic position in relation to its enemy neighbors, fearing that it could be struck in a surprise attack on three fronts simultaneously. Building a superior military organization was uppermost in the minds of government policy-makers. The Arab states also found themselves in a disadvantageous position. The primary goals of building an Arab-Palestinian state had been lost rather than realized. Israel's preparation for war posed a threat to Arab countries. Thus, while intensive active conflict had been halted, neither side was satisfied with the resolution.

Between 1951 and 1956, both sides engaged in terrorism of various sorts against one another, and a second major military confrontation took place in October, 1956, known as the Suez War or the Sinai Campaign. President Nasser of Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal Company in July of that year,

following evacuation of British forces from the canal zone in accordance with a 1954 agreement. He wanted to invest the total revenue from the canal in the Aswan High Dam project, which was at the center of his plan for social reform and economic progress. Furthermore, these revenues would eliminate the great need for dependency on Western foreign assistance. At the time of nationalization, there were concerns in the international community about how Nasser might try to utilize the Canal to further his foreign policy. Nasser broke the Anglo-Franco-American arms supply monopoly in 1955 by concluding an arms-cotton agreement with Czechoslovakia; this was followed in 1956 by an arms deal with the USSR, and Egyptian bilateral defense arrangements with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen were signed. Nasser had emerged as a central figure in Middle Eastern politics.

A short time after nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the British had apparently determined that they would use force to recover the Canal and compel Nasser to lose his position. To that end, the United Kingdom made a covert arrangement with France and Israel, both of whom had reasons to participate in curbing Egyptian activities and overthrowing Nasser. For example, France was persuaded that Egypt was providing vital assistance to the revolutionaries in Algeria, and Israel was concerned about its shipping difficulties since Nasser had closed the Straits of Tiran, blocking the access to Israel's port at Eliat. Border raids from the Gaza area into Israeli territory were increasing. On October 29, 1956, Israel with British and French support, launched an attack into the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt. Fighting continued until November 7, when a cease-fire was put into effect. Nasser felt he had obtained some political leverage by nationalizing the Canal Company, and by actions taken in the UN Security Council by the USA and USSR in opposing Israel. For their part, the Israelis in the course of the conflict had taken over Gaza, Sharm el-Sheikh and the Straits of Tiran. This action eliminated the Arab raids and reduced shipping route problems.

The United Nations played a vital role in establishing a cease-fire in the Middle East. It was the decision of the UN to place a 4,000 troop emergency force, known as the UNEF, to guard the Suez area and seek to prevent future hostilities. Host country consent, however, is necessary for UNEF entry. Israel did not permit the UN created emergency force on its territory, but troops were placed on Egyptian soil, with the understanding that withdrawal of consent for stationing the troops would require the departure of UNEF from Egypt. By May 1957, UN troops were in position, Israeli forces had withdrawn from all areas beyond the 1949 armistice demarcation lines, and the operation of the Suez Canal resumed. Ships from all states except Israel, were allowed to use the waterway.

Between 1957 and 1966, the situation in the Middle East was frequently discussed in the UN Security Council. Syria, Jordan and Israel repeatedly submitted complaints concerning cease-fire violations, resulting in adopted resolutions urging the parties to cooperate with the UN organizations in the area. During this period, various attempts at Arab unity were tried, some inter-Arab tensions increased, and nationalist feelings were growing among the Palestinian

Arab refugees.[2] A number of Palestinian fighting organizations were formed, yet there was relatively little coordination between their actions. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which later would emerge as the main group representing Palestinian interests, was established at the 1964-65 Arab Summit Meetings.

By 1967, numerous terror and counter-terror activities were taking place between the Israelis and Palestinians. Border clashes between Israel and Lebanon and Syria were increasing, and troop buildups on Israeli borders were in evidence on both sides. Nasser, on May 16, 1967, requested that the UNEF be withdrawn from the Suez area. The UN Secretary-General, U Thant, concluded that Egypt had the right to ask for UNEF withdrawal so its troops could be moved up to the border as Israel had been doing. Once UNEF withdrawal was complete, the Israelis were denied further access to shipping in the Straits of Tiran. The Arabs were pleased with their political position, while Israel, fearing an attack on three fronts, launched a pre-emptive strike on the Arabs on June 5, 1967.

Why did the third Arab-Israel war occur in June, 1967? The Arabs insist they did not intend to attack Israel but were trying to prepare for the Israeli blow which in fact did come. Nasser, in announcing the reinstituted blockade against Israeli shipping in the Straits of Tiran may have planned to use it as a bargaining position, but Israel interpreted it as aggression. Like the battles of October, 1956, the Arabs felt the Israeli action was another episode in a long-term campaign of Israeli aggression and conquest against Arab peoples. The Israelis were seized by the fear they were to be attacked from all sides by an enemy who was determined to eliminate them. This is a classic case where action was based on perceptions of hostility and intentions of the enemy; each side interpreted threats of the enemy as an intolerable situation. Each side felt it necessary to amass military capability. The United States served as Israel's major benefactor for military equipment, and an assortment of military and economic assistance was provided Egypt and Syria by the Soviet Union.

The military confrontation in 1967, known as the "June War" or the "Six Day War," was clearly a case of decisive Israeli victory. Israeli military forces moved in three directions resulting in complete takeover of the Sinai Peninsula all the way to the eastern banks of the Suez Canal, and they also acquired control over the Gaza strip, gained possession of the entire west bank of the Jordan River that had been under Jordanian rule, conquered the Jordanian held part of Jerusalem, and in battle with Syria, achieved territorial control over the Golan Heights area.

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[2]In 1958, Syria and Egypt merged to form the United Arab Republic, which lasted until 1961, when Syria seceded. Egypt continued to call itself the UAR until September, 1971. Iraq underwent a revolution, and a leftist leadership gained power. The country adopted an ideology that was pro-Soviet, anti-Nasser and which continued to be opposed to the Israelis. Some of the Arab states were conservative kingdoms, maintaining traditional societies despite their riches from oil revenues. Others, such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq, talked of Arab socialism and unity. Although they shared a common religion, Islam, and a common enemy, Israel, their agreements on governmental policy were relatively few. Opposition to Israel remained the one consistent element of unity in the Arab world.

The fact that a single military organization accomplished this in such a short time is impressive. But it does indicate the extremely high level of military preparedness and operations in the Israeli system and the seeming lack of it among the Arab states. As war victor, Israel claimed it had achieved a viable geo-strategic position, taking into account the new borders established by the recently conquered territories, enhancing its national security. Did the Israeli military campaign really increase national security? Since fears among Arabs about Jewish expansionist activities had been confirmed, security for Arab states was reduced. The Arabs were beaten, and their hostility towards Israel only increased, affecting in turn, threat perceptions and perhaps, insecurity felt by Israel. Along with the territories taken, Israel had acquired some of the Palestine refugee camps and the refugee problem overall had been multiplied. The Arabs would have to regroup, improve their military strategy and organization for future encounters with their common enemy.

Cease-fire resolution agreements were signed once again between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria, in June, 1967. The following autumn, at the United Nations Security Council meetings, Resolution 242 was unanimously adopted. It is believed by many political observers that it remains the most practical and acceptable basis for achieving a peaceful settlement and should be implemented. It is reproduced here:

Resolution 242[3]

(Adopted by the United Nations Security Council,
November 22, 1967)

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the charter.

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

   (a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,

   (b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for the acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and

[3]United Nations document S/RES/242. (1967) (S/8247).

political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Both Egypt and Israel saw some favorable elements in the resolution, but they were wary of some of the other requirements. The states recognized that the unsettled situation, as a result of Israel's victory in the June War, created serious problems. All parties wanted a change in the status quo—yet neither was willing to compromise on principles which it held dear.

Gunnar Jarring was the envoy selected by the United Nations to serve as mediator between the governments of Israel and Egypt to smooth their problems. Numerous meetings were held during the years following 1967, but solutions were not reached. The mere fact that Israel now occupied 27,000 additional square miles of territory expanded the Palestinian refugee population within Israeli borders. And, military clashes in the Suez Canal continued despite the resolutions in the UN. Following the 1967 war, Egypt made the decision to close the canal indefinitely. (It was reopened on June 5, 1975.)

Positions of the parties hardened—Israel declared it would never go back to the borders of June 4, 1967, and continued to incorporate its newly acquired territories into regular Israeli economic life. Almost daily, Egyptian-Israeli artillery duels across the Suez Canal occurred. Palestinians and Israelis engaged in raids that affected not only Israeli territory, but crossed the Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese frontiers. The Soviet Union was supplying considerable military assistance to Egypt and Syria, and the Israeli military machine was provided assistance primarily from the United States.

In June, 1970, the United States proposed a three-month cease-fire (The Rogers Plan) between Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Israel, each of whom agreed to the plan. The Palestinian group, the Palestine Liberation Organization, did not agree to it. The cease-fire arrangement was put into effect in August. Other provisions of the plan, including Egyptian recognition of Israeli sovereignty and

Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands, were never realized, and the talks broke down shortly thereafter.

Nasser died in September, 1970, when he had just accepted the American initiative which intended to reactivate Jarring talks, stressing these talks aim at real and lasting peace. Anwar Sadat, former Vice President of Egypt, was chosen as president after Nasser's death. For several months he gave priority to internal problems, but conflict with Israel continued to influence events, and Sadat joined a military oriented federation with Libya and Syria in 1971. In May of that year, a 15-year pact between Egypt and the USSR was formed, whereby the Soviets would continue to supply Egypt with arms and various forms of technical assistance.

The Palestinian guerilla groups continued to intensify their raids of terrorism on Israel. Commando forces of Israel had responded, and sometimes overreacted, by striking at guerilla bases in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Now the Palestinian activities were expanding, and several cases of hijacking of international aircraft occurred with hostages taken. The Olympic incident at Munich, where a number of Israeli athletes were killed by a guerilla group, was one of the most dramatic. Some of these activities were the work of extremist groups while others were claimed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to be part of its operations. The Palestinian case was continually brought before public attention and world public opinion was forming.

The fourth and largest Arab-Israeli war erupted on October 6, 1973. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal into Sinai, establishing two long narrow bridgeheads along the east side. Syria drove into Golan Heights. Egypt and Syria were supplied by massive military airlifts from the USSR.[4] The United States provided airlifts to Israel. Israel drove Syria back in the Golan area, and trapped the Egyptian third army in Sinai by surrounding Suez City.

A cease-fire began on October 24, and UN peacekeeping forces, 7,000 strong, were dispatched to the area. The Arab oil producing countries decided at that point to place a ban on oil exports to the United States, in response to its support to Israel. (The ban was lifted in March, 1974.) On October 25, President Nixon placed the United States military forces on world wide precautionary alert, after Kissinger claimed there were "ambiguous" signals that the USSR might intervene militarily in the Middle East situation.

In December, 1973, the disputing parties agreed to participate in peace talks in Geneva. The Palestinian organization—the PLO—however, was not included among the formal participants. They argued for admission to the talks, perhaps replacing Jordan. Their strategic use of violence marked their efforts to achieve a kind of diplomatic recognition.

1974 witnessed several hopeful peaceful developments in the Middle East situation. Following negotiations with Kissinger, Israel withdrew from the Suez west bank. Egypt then occupied a strip 5-7½ miles wide along the east bank, and

[4] In 1972, Sadat ordered most of the 20,000 Soviet Military Advisors to leave Egypt because he wanted the country to be independent from foreign influence.

the UN took over a buffer zone separating the forces from the Israelis. Withdrawal was completed in March, and Israel and Syria signed a disengagement accord in May, which was also initiated by the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. After 23 days of shuttling back and forth between Syria and Israel, the parties reached an agreement on disengaging forces in the Golan Heights. This style of diplomatic action has come to be known as "shuttle diplomacy," in the popular press.

Relations improved between the United States and the Arabs. Diplomatic relations that had been cutoff since the war of 1967 were resumed between the United States and Egypt, and the U.S. and Syria. In June, 1974, President Nixon announced that America would provide Egypt with nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Shortly before his resignation, he visited Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon on a good will tour. He was received well in Egypt, but in Saudi Arabia, King Faisal warned him that no real peace could be attained in the area until occupied territories were liberated and the people of Palestine gained their rights culminating in the creation of a new nation-state. During the same period, the U.S. reiterated its continued military and economic cooperation with Israel.

In the autumn, 20 Arab nations met in Rabat, Morocco, and issued a declaration supporting the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the rights of the Palestinian peoples. They called for the creation of an independent Palestinian state on any Palestinian land that is liberated from Israeli occupation. Yasir Arafat was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. They agreed also on a substantial financial assistance program to aid the PLO. At the United Nations General Assembly that year, a vote was taken giving the PLO a voice in the assembly, and Arafat was invited to speak before the group. The PLO is the first non-governmental delegation to be admitted to a plenary session of the UN General Assembly, and Arafat was the first non-governmental spokesman (in addition to the Pope) to address the group. In November, the Assembly passed a resolution asserting the rights of the Palestinians to return to their homes, recognized their rights to self-determination, and decided that the PLO was the representative group for the Palestinians.

What are the likely developments of the future? The situation in the Middle East is still far from a stable peace. Egypt is concerned with regaining more of its territory lost to Israel in the 1967 war in the Sinai. Israel would like the Arabs to agree to a non-belligerency position so they would not be continually threatened by attack. The Palestinians, principally the PLO, are intent in acquiring territory and being formalized into a nation-state.

Most astute political observers feel that the situation is extremely delicate, and that the longer the fundamental issues remain unsolved, the greater is the likelihood of yet another Arab-Israeli war. We shall turn to a brief look at some of these issues.

There are many ways to look at various problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The issues, while interconnected, are separated here into major groups.

Palestinians

There is a basic agreement among all Arabs that the Israeli state was formed with the determination of the Zionists to take over all of Palestine. They regard the result as an injustice to the Arab majority in the area. Until the injustices are admitted by Israel, steps towards a solution to the basic problem remain difficult and inadequate. Palestinian Arab nationalism has grown particularly since the war of June, 1967. Although defeated in the first war of 1948-49, when numbers of refugees were created, the nationalism did not dominate politics of the area then. For the next 20 years, Arabs of Palestine—although identified as Palestinians in their countries of exile—lacked any effective leadership or specific territory in which they exercised political representation. Areas of Palestine not taken over by Israel were incorporated into Jordan and Egypt. Jordan agreed to grant citizenship to the Palestinians as a way to broaden her narrow population base. They did receive Jordanian citizenship, were represented in the Jordanian parliament and achieved some high posts in the government of the country, but the most nationalist of them regarded the arrangement as an intrusion in their right to self-determination. In Syria and Lebanon, Palestinians were regarded as outsiders, separate from the host country.

At the close of warfare in 1949, the United Nations set up the UN refugee relief and works projects agency for the Near East (UNRWA) to provide the basic needs of the Palestinian refugee population. At present, there are more than one million refugees, mainly housed in camps set up by the United Nations Agency, located in various occupied territories held by Israel—the Gaza strip, Sinai, Golan Heights. A majority live on the west bank of the Jordan River. Many Palestinians are unemployed, and no government under which they have been ruled up to this time has been particularly concerned with economic and social advancement of these people.

The west bank area, taken over by Israeli forces in 1967, was to have formed part of the original Palestinian state if the UN partition plan had been enacted. It was annexed by Jordan in 1950, and because it is a very rich land area, a substantial portion of the Jordanian economy was dependent on the region. By the mid-1960's a substantial amount of Jordan's agricultural products came from the west bank, accounting for a significant proportion of the country's GNP.

Various Palestine guerilla organizations established themselves in Jordanian territory during the 1960's; some bases were situated in the west bank area and from there, raids were launched into Israel until this section was taken over by Israel in the 1967 war. These Palestinian groups, recognizing the authority of their own forces, behaved as autonomous entities within Jordan, eventually prompting the Jordanian government, in 1970, to set up provisions tightening control over the guerillas. By September, relations between the parties had deteriorated and the country engaged in civil war. Several agreements were reached that autumn, but were largely ineffective. Minor clashes continued. King Hussein, who had made conciliatory gestures towards the Palestinian guerillas during the early part of 1970, decided, in 1971, to expel all such bases from Jordanian land. This accomplished result was announced by the Prime Minister

of Jordan in July, 1971. Other Arab states condemned Jordan's destructions of the guerillas—Iraq, Libya and Syria broke diplomatic relations with Jordan. Pressures against the country continued until the period just prior to the October war two years later when, under Egyptian leadership, relations were restored among Syria, Egypt and Jordan.

The Israelis, for their part, express a strong position on the matter of a Palestinian state. They feel the solution lies in the hands of Jordan which must integrate the Palestinians into their society. They do not recognize the PLO, claiming that their recognition violates the UN charter provision that nations must be peaceloving since Israel has been victim of many guerilla raids. They believe, moreover, that terrorist activities should not be legitimatized by the formation and recognition of a Palestinian state. The Israelis seem bent on separating the Palestinians into two groups—the refugees, and the terrorists. Although all Arab nations officially recognized the PLO as official spokesman for the Palestinians, it is precisely that principle that the Israelis deny.

The Palestinians as a group have been brought into world attention not only through their recent terrorist activities and attempts to gain diplomatic recognition. On numerous occasions in the United Nations, Israel has been chided for its defiance of Human Rights treatment accorded to those who are in refugee camps in Israeli occupied territories conquered in the 1967 war. With the Rabat meeting in autumn, 1974, when Arab nations recognized the PLO and their goal of self-determination, however, the Palestinian aspect of the overall Middle East problem has acquired a new focus.

When Yasir Arafat, head of the PLO, addressed the UN General Assembly in October, 1974, he asked the group to support the Palestinian rights to self-determination for establishing a homeland. At the same time he indicated that the UN had no right to partition the area at all, since Palestine was an indivisible country. He stressed that a fifth Arab-Israeli war was likely, given the stern stance Israel has taken in their treatment of the Palestinian problem. In an effort to alter the current situation, the PLO and other affiliated groups continue their terrorist activities against Israel.

Occupied Land

Since the June war in 1967, Israel has occupied territories spanning 27,000 square miles and comprising 3.5 times the size of Israel itself. An inhabitant population of approximately one million, consisting mainly of Palestinians, has been added along with these territories. The major losses to the Arab states were the Sinai Peninsula, and the west bank of Jordan. Other conquered territories include the Golan Heights, the Gaza strip and the sections of Jerusalem formerly under Jordanian control.

The west bank of Jordan, as already mentioned, was intended to be a part of the Palestinian state under the United Nations partition plan. More than 600,000 Palestinians, the largest concentration of the population inherited by Israel in 1967, reside in the territory. King Hussein has said he might consider autonomy

for the west bank, which would become part of a Palestinian state, but Israel has shown no interest in establishing it as an autonomous state.

The Sinai Peninsula was under Egyptian control until the conclusion of the 1967 war. Situated between the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, the Suez Canal runs along the northwest corner of the peninsula and the Straits of Tiran are located to the extreme south. Prior to the Six Day war, Egypt kept the Suez Canal open, and Israel, while denied its usage, did have access to the Red Sea via the Gulf of Eilat through the Tiran Straits. Egypt established control over a small section of Sinai bordering the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez after the war of 1973, but the majority of land area is still occupied by Israel.

The Golan Heights consist of 714 square miles dividing Israel and Syria, at a segment of Israeli northwestern borders. The area has been used as a military fortress by both parties. Intensive battle between the states occurred in the October, 1973, confrontation, and during 1974, an agreement was reached between the parties, through the offices of U.S. Secretary of State, Kissinger. Syria regained portions of the area, but Israel still has jurisdiction of sections taken in 1967. UN observer forces are stationed in Golan, and part of the territory has been designated as a demilitarized zone.

Gaza Strip, a small piece of land jutting eastwards from the Sinai Peninsula that borders on the Mediterranean Sea and Israel, was administered by Egypt from 1949 until June, 1967. The area is inhabited by more than 350,000 refugees who are mainly housed in camps established by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The area was never formally annexed by Egypt and the population was never integrated into Egyptian political and economic life. From the Gaza Strip, terrorist raids have been launched into Israel. Since the 1967 war, Israel has controlled the Strip, ruling by a military government.

The City of Jerusalem, according to a United Nations General Assembly resolution passed in 1949, was to be separated from Israeli and Jordanian control and placed under a special international administration within the UN Trusteeship council. This resolution has never been put into effect, and from 1949 to 1967, control was divided between Israel and Jordan, the latter maintaining its jurisdiction over the old city and the east. In the 1967 conflict, Israel took over the Jordanian holdings, and presently occupies the whole city and environs. The city which serves as Israel's capital, is sacred to followers of Islamic and Jewish faiths (Christians, too) and the matter of protecting the Holy Places has been a concern in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Possession of these areas offers the Israelis a bargaining position with the Arabs and affords the state some strategic advantages as well. However, retention of the territories exacerbates the relationships with Arab countries. These states view the Israelis as aggressors, and continue to press for the return of lost land.

Suez Canal

The blocking of the Suez Canal in 1956 caused a shortage of oil and oil products in Europe. Since 1967, when the canal was closed, it was doubtful

whether the canal would ever recover its central position in oil transport. By sending giant oil tankers around Africa, oil companies have been managing without the Suez and now many tankers are too big to get through the canal.

The Egyptians widened and deepened the canal after nationalization in 1956, thus improving its capability. The canal formally reopened on June 5, 1975, but it is not yet known to what extent the Israelis may be granted use of it. Sadat has declared Port Said to be free, and while Israel still desires the freedom of navigation, the Egyptian response is unclear. Thus the problem remains a potential source for fresh outbreak of war, although since reopening it is more likely that a solution will be found.

Oil

In the 20th Century, the Middle East has become a vital source of crude oil. Oil production has caused a basic transformation of the area. Formerly barren desert is now dotted with commercial activity and centers of communication. Four of the eight largest oil-producing countries in the world are in the Middle East—Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait and Iraq. Four other countries are large-scale producers.

World oil consumption is expected to rise sharply in the next decade, and the role of the Middle East in the supply of oil to the West is bound to grow at a similar rate. Both Western Europe and Japan depend heavily on the Middle East for oil, their chief source of energy. Ninety percent of the oil produced in the Middle East is exported. The large scale supply of distant markets has posed some difficult transportation problems. The nearest sea outlet to the largest oilfields is the Persian Gulf. The Suez Canal was a vital link; about half the Middle East oil output was until 1967, exported through the canal.

The development of the Middle East oil industry has led to far reaching economic and social changes in the producing countries and the entire area. Revenues derived from the royalties and other payments help finance the budgets of the producing countries. The oil companies set up social services for the local populations which their own governments were previously unable to provide. They established schools, which they later transferred to the care of the governments, and provided vocational and technical instruction to train skilled personnel for the oil industry. They built modern housing for their workers, constructed roads and set up medical services.

Lebanon, Syria and Jordan receive substantial royalties on the transit of oil through their territories. Egypt profited too, until 1967, from oil transit through the Suez Canal. Several Arab countries benefit from the financial aid granted or loaned by their oil-producing neighbors for developmental projects. Since 1967, Egypt and Jordan have received considerable permanent subsidies from their oil-rich neighbors. The Palestinian Arab guerilla and sabotage organizations are largely financed by the oil-rich Arab regions, particularly Libya, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms.

What about the future? Western Europe continues to depend on Middle Eastern oil, even though in recent times concession conditions have become more and more favorable to the producing country at the expense of the Western oil

companies and the companies less able to influence the relations between the producing country and themselves. As to the Soviet Union and the East European nations' part in Middle East oil affairs, opinions differ. The Soviet bloc countries have no direct interest in or need for Middle East oil. In times of conflict, they might attempt to deny the oil to the West, otherwise they are content to aid the countries of the region with political support in their struggle with Western oil interests and to supply technical and financial aid in their efforts to develop an independent national oil industry. However, Soviets are appearing as buyers, and some experts believe that in the 1980's the USSR will need large quantities of Middle East oil.

The Middle East still remains largely unexplored. Prospecting in the region may reasonably be expected to yield further large quantities of oil. Taking into account the large-scale production and vast reserves of the Middle East, coupled with the expected rise in world consumption, the affluence and power of the Arab area seems assured. It may also be assumed that the international oil companies will continue to develop the Middle East oil industry, even though they may have to transfer an ever increasing share of their profits to the producing countries themselves.

The Middle East situation occupies a central position in international politics. The issues are fascinating in their complexity; a number of fundamental disagreements remain and the consequences of various policies affect not only the Middle Eastern states themselves but a variety of countries around the world. Clearly, some of the major problems focus on the future of the Palestinian people, which will continue as an issue to be confronted by Israel's governmental decision-makers; and, for the Arab nations, a new bargaining weapon—the political uses of oil—has been developed to enhance these states both economically and politically. This may pose a problem for western countries, where primary oil needs exist, leading possibly to more carefully constructed foreign policies for the dealings between these countries and the Middle Eastern states.

What information do governmental decision-makers of Middle East countries seek out and evaluate in determining the best course for future actions? A lot of intelligence is gathered with this purpose in mind, and unfortunately, the public does not gain access easily to such documentary evidence. In addition, though, governments look to the open record, including newspapers, to expand the catalogue of materials. Numerous political and military activities have taken place between participant countries in the Middle East conflict. Many events were reported in newspapers like the *New York Times*. Barry Blechman, a research investigator and policy analyst, has gathered together information about these events covering the time period June, 1949, through June, 1969, and categorized each activity by asking several questions:

1. Which country in the Middle East is identified as initiator of the action?
2. What type of action occurs?
3. Which Middle East country is the target of the action?
4. What is the issue area of the action?

5. When did the event happen?

Rather than considering all of the Middle East nations, Blechman decided to focus only on the following countries: Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. All but Iraq share a common border with Israel. Since many conflictual activities occur between Israel and the adjacent neighboring states, a fairly rich picture of events in the Middle East may be obtained by limiting the study to these countries. Blechman was interested in two separate matters that involved these six countries in Middle Eastern politics—when the country initiated the action, and when it was the target of another country's activities. He labeled the first category, ACTOR, and the second, TARGET.

A classification system was constructed to identify various types of action occurring between the countries. The history of politics in the area indicates that the nations engage in a wide range of activities or events. For example, any country may offer proposals to solve particular issues, reject the proposals put forth by others, register complaints with the United Nations, hold demonstrations, establish and break diplomatic relations, threaten military attacks or engage in direct military action. To differentiate this wide range of activities, Blechman set up 22 basic categories, identifying each by a single key word like, PROPOSE, APPROVE, WARN, THREATEN. Each event was placed into one of the 22 categories and this classification system was labeled ACTION TYPE.

As we have seen, there are a number of different issues forming part of the general Middle East conflict, and Blechman considered it important to try to match each event he studied with one basic issue-area. Which events have been associated with the Palestinian refugee problem? How many and what kinds of activities have occurred over the status of Jerusalem? What about events surrounding the peace proposals? The categories of event subject matter are grouped under the heading, ARENA. Here, he grouped the issues into eight categories, combining certain sets of issues into a single class. One category includes all events that were related to: the Suez Canal, Gulf of Aqaba, and Arab economic and diplomatic boycotts of Israel. Other categories, however, contain single issue areas, like the Palestinian refugee problem.

It is important to know when the events happened. Blechman has gathered his information over a 20-year period, ending in June, 1969. Examining the entire time span would provide a more thorough analysis. By looking at the events in the late 1960's, we get a summary picture of activities occurring before and after the June War in 1967, and have the most up-to-date information available from Blechman's study. Therefore only the period from January, 1965, through June, 1969, has been selected for analysis.

The entire category system or CODEBOOK, has been summarized in the Appendix. Each of the original questions raised about the events has been translated into a key word descriptor and called a variable. Accompanying values on the variable identify different countries, actions or issues. An illustration of this format is given here:

Question: Which country in the Middle East is identified as the initiator of the action?

Variable Label: ACTOR

Variable Values:

1. Israel
2. Egypt
3. Jordan
4. Syria
5. Lebanon
6. Iraq

EXERCISE 1
(Blechman, Middle East Events Data Set)

These exercises are designed as summarizing devices used to process and interpret information that decision-makers deem important. Summarizing techniques differ; questions may be approached at many levels, using simple or highly sophisticated analyses. An important point to remember is the depth of understanding and hence, ability to make sense out of substantive materials, is closely tied to an analyst's mastery of various summarization methods themselves. Matters of interpretation will depend, moreover, on the decision-makers's preestablished perceptions of the situation. Students having a background in basic statistics will probably want to compute nominal tests of association or interpret such measures which often accompany results on the tabulations suggested below.

1. *How many events (actions) of different types are associated with each of the six countries of the Middle East?*
   The two variables labeled ACTOR and ACTION TYPE can be compared to answer this question. This information will indicate the number of times Israel, for example, has engaged in the various action categories like "Propose," "Threaten," "Reject" and so on. This will give you a picture of the concentration various countries have placed on specific event types.

2. *When did the actions occur?*
   To find out how many actions of each type occurred during each of the years, divide first the YEAR, i.e., take 1965 separately, and then get an accounting or tabulation of the event-actions across the 22 categories in ACTION TYPE.

3. *Which countries have been the target of various forms of action in Middle Eastern politics?*
   This may be ascertained by comparing TARGET with ACTION TYPE.

4. *What type of actions, within the issue areas, have different countries engaged in?*
   This information can be acquired by looking separately at each of the six countries and comparing the events as they fall into the ACTION TYPE and ARENA categories.

5. *Which activities are regarded as factual or disputed information by the parties?*
   The recorded events may be divided according to the reliability of the source reporting them. Border incidents may be reported by a target country and denied by the alleged initiator. Understanding country policy often means knowing what information is accepted as truth and what is viewed as disputable evidence. A variable in the codebook labeled RELIABILITY contains different categories that range from "factual" to "reported by target, denied by actor." By looking separately at the six countries, you might compare ACTION TYPE with RELIABILITY.
6. To get an overall picture of the Middle East situation during this period, you may want to compare the ACTOR and TARGET categories, to determine who is trying to affect whom. Comparing ACTOR and ARENA would be useful in assessing the relative attention or focus given to various issues by different states.

Questions:

1. If you were an Israeli decision-maker, what conclusions would you reach given the analysis of the 1965-69 events in the Middle East, about each of the Arab states included in Blechman's study?
2. What conclusions are the Arab states policy-makers likely to draw about Israeli behavior towards them in the late 1960's?
3. Assuming you are an impartial observer of the Arab-Israeli conflict, what more or less "objective facts" would you conclude about interactions between the parties based on Blechman's data?
4. Compare and contrast interpretations given to Israeli and Arab actions from the oppositions' perspective, with the impartial analysis.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Middle East situation has been on the UN agenda nearly every year since the organization was created in 1945. There have been various attempts at negotiation, and resolutions have been passed both in the Security Council and the General Assembly urging the parties to form a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Commissions have been established to deal with specific problems like the Palestinian refugees, and the UN has provided continued economic support for them. Several peacekeeping forces have been sent to the area—in 1949, and after the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, when cease-fire agreements that originated in the UN body were put into effect. Still the UN organization has been unable to establish a firm lasting settlement to the disputes in the area. Nonetheless, it remains a significant forum where the parties may voice their positions, and other states in the international community have participated in various ways, among them casting votes on resolutions put forth to the two central decision-making bodies, the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Security Council resolutions on Middle East problems have been adopted each year since 1967, and at various points prior to that time. During 1973 and 1974, nearly all votes were unanimously in favor of the resolutions put before the council. Council membership included 14 countries, of which five—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China, are permanently appointed. The remaining nine serve on a rotating basis. In the 1973 and 1974 sessions, China did not cast a vote on any of the Middle East resolutions. Iraq, selected for council participation in 1974, followed the same course of non-action. The content of these matters focused on several themes. At the time of the October War, three cease-fire resolutions were passed and the parties were urged to begin negotiations. Other matters put before a vote concerned the establishment of UN peacekeeping forces (UNEF), and condemnation of Israel for violating international peace and an urging that the country desist from military actions. No resolutions have unilaterally condemned the Arabs.

The voting pattern in the General Assembly, where each UN member is permitted to cast a ballot, is different. Unlike the cohesion or agreement among Security Council members in their voting records, a number of countries in this larger UN body have demonstrated dissent from the majority opinion by casting "abstention" ballots. (This simply means parties are present at the roll call, but choose not to vote yea or nay. It is nonetheless counted as a vote.) The 1973

General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East have been arranged below according to the size of the yea tally. A brief description of each resolution accompanies the voting results. (See Table I)

TABLE I

United Nations 28th Session: General Assembly
Resolutions on the Middle East Situation

Resolution No.	Description	Yes	No	Abs.	Total
3090	UNRWA commended	125	0	0	125
2089A	Money requested from members to support UNRWA	122	0	2	124
3089B	Money requested from members to support UNRWA	121	0	3	124
3092A	Israel should comply with Geneva convention	120	0	5	125
3089C	Israeli treatment of refugees deplored	110	4	12	126
3175	Arabs have permanent sovereignty over Israeli occupied territories	93	4	24	121
3092B	Israel should comply with Geneva convention, and desist from annexing or colonizing occupied territories	90	7	27	124
3089D	Respect declared for Palestinian right of self-determination and rights for refugees	87	6	33	126
3089E	UNRWA money requested, parties asked not to give directly to Palestinians but to UN	35	20	62	117

Where negative votes were cast, Israel was always among them. The Arab states voted a united front, usually "yes" on the resolutions except the last one, where Saudi Arabia and Jordan voted yea and the others abstained. Israel was joined with the United States, France and Britain in voting no on resolution 3089E. The United States and the Soviet Union were never in agreement, as the former was often voting with Israel (or, would abstain when Israel cast a negative ballot, and the Soviet Union consistently agreed with the Arab bloc.) These votes illustrate an interesting overview of international feelings with regard to Israeli rights. As the condemnation towards the state was stronger, and rights for the Palestinians elaborated in the resolutions, the number of yes votes diminished, and the abstention tally grew. Compare, for example, resolution numbers 3089C, 3175 and 3092B. The resolution regarding rights for the Palestinians (3089D) is noteworthy because it offers an insight to Assembly action taken on the matter in 1974.

Three resolutions in the 29th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (1974) were passed concerning the Palestinians. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was invited to participate in a debate on the Palestinian Question. Arafat, recognized leader of the group, addressed the General Assembly. Later, during the session, a resolution to grant the PLO permanent observer status at the Assembly and at UN sponsored international conferences was put to a vote. And, on November 22, 1974, the PLO was recognized as the representative group for the Palestinians, and the right of the

Palestinians to self-determination was expressed. The voting outcomes are shown here:

TABLE II

United Nations 29th Session: Selected General Assembly Resolutions on the Middle East Situation

	Yes	No	Abs.	Total
1. Invite the PLO to debate the Palestine Question.	105	4	20	129
2. Grant the PLO permanent observer status at UN.	95	17	19	131
3. Recognize the PLO as Palestinian representative, urge Palestinians rights of self-determination.	87	8	37	132

The direction taken by the United Nations seems fairly clear—the Palestinians have gained a foothold to a status position in the community of nations. Will the Palestinian question be resolved? Will Israel yield to international pressures to relinquish occupied territories? Or will there be another battle between the parties before negotiations are achieved? These are matters that undoubtedly will be discussed at future UN meetings.

EXERCISE 2

In preparation for the role-playing exercise, updated information about resolutions introduced in the Security Council and the General Assembly is needed. The assignment may be undertaken by the class at large or made the primary responsibility of the United Nations team. Data on resolutions and respective vote tallies since the 29th Session (1974) are available from several sources. The ICPSR gathers this information annually; however, most recent records will be about a year old, since results are summarized in machine-readable form. UN documents, Almanacs, Yearbooks, newspapers represent other sources for collecting roll call data. Table III is left blank to serve as a work sheet for completing the roll call record on UN resolutions.

Questions:

1. Are there identifiable trends taken in UN resolutions with respect to issues and positions that seem more dominant?
2. What would you expect the Israeli perceptions of UN voting activity to be? What conclusions would Israel probably draw about its position in the International Community of Nations? What kinds of policy choices might the country contemplate given their perceptions?
3. From the overall picture of UN activity recently, what are some of the likely perceptions among Palestinians concerning international support? How would radical and moderate identifiers within the Palestine Liberation movement differ in their interpretations on this matter? What policies are likely to follow from each position?

TABLE III

UN Sessions: General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions on the Middle East Situation

Session No.	Date	Resolution No.	GA or SC?	Description	Votes				US/USSR Agree?	ISR/Arabs Agree?
					Yes	No	Abs.	Total		

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Perhaps one of the most ironic aspects of the Middle East situation is that in spite of the concern expressed by the major states—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France—that peace be achieved, all these countries continue to export various forms of military assistance to the disputants. The theory of deterrence is applicable here. Disputing states continue to arm fearing their opponent is doing the same. In the event of future conflict, the side possessing greater military capability is presumed to be at an advantage and more likely to win its objectives. Similarly, if conflicting parties decide to negotiate their differences, the stronger state (measured by capabilities) often is presumed to be in a better bargaining position.

The United States has been the major supplier to Israel from the beginning, and the Soviet Union has served that role for Egypt and Syria. Both the U.S. and the USSR have provided armaments to other Arab countries as well, and the U.S. has provided considerable military supplies to Iran. The following data on arms imports to certain Middle Eastern nations give a perspective on the escalating quantity of military might that is being introduced into the area.

TABLE IV

World Arms Trade: Recipient Countries by Major Suppliers Cumulative 1965-1973

Country	Total* Imports	Imports USA	Imports USSR	Imports France	Imports UK	Imports Other
Israel	1531	1274	0	127	53	77
Egypt	2507	2	2305	0	0	200
Jordan	354	279	0	3	52	20
Syria	1244	2	1153	0	1	88
Lebanon	106	16	3	73	2	12
Saudi Arabia	537	348	0	55	90	44
Iran	2044	1310	438	1	129	166
Iraq	874	18	742	7	15	92

*Total importation of arms in millions of current U.S. dollars—i.e., current at the time of importation.

Source: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade: 1963-1973,* Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

EXERCISE 3

Fill in Table V by calculating the percentage of arms each state has imported from the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom, respectively, as a ratio of total arms imported. For example, computing Israel's percentage of U.S. arms, 1274 ÷ 1531 = .83 x 100 = 83%.

TABLE V

Percentage of Arms Trade by Major Suppliers to Selected Middle Eastern Countries, 1965-1973

Country	Total Imports	Import % USA	Import % USSR	Import % France	Import % UK	Import % Others
Israel	1531	83				
Egypt	2507					
Jordan	354					
Syria	1244					
Lebanon	106					
Saudi Arabia	537					
Iran	2044					
Iraq	874					

Questions:

1. Which countries received the greatest share of arms from the U.S.? from the USSR?
2. What images are the decision-makers in the United States and Soviet Union going to hold about one another concerning military involvement in the Middle East throughout these years?

EXERCISE 4

Decision-makers need other information to assess military capabilities for the primary disputing parties. Such materials allow an evaluation of relative strengths for the countries, determining each nation's ability to meet its stated objectives. Some capability information about eight Middle Eastern countries is arrayed in the following tables. For the most part, the information is given for each year from 1965 to 1973.

1. Rank the countries on each of the eight characteristics, for 1965 and 1973. The term usually associated with a set of characteristics that vary is called a VARIABLE. The ranking procedure simply means that you look at all the information given along one variable in any given year and assign the highest figure as rank position 1, the next highest as position 2, with the lowest assigned as rank 8. These ranks provide one way of analyzing relative capability strength. Use Table VI for this purpose.

2. Chart the growth pattern of each country on two variables—Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GNP and Arms Imports in Constant Dollars—by inserting information into the graphs labeled Figure 1 and 2. The vertical line must be appropriately labeled before any data can be positioned. If, for example, our variable contained values between 0 and 100, we would probably label the bottom point "0," and the very top, "100." We might continue by placing a slash at the middle and labeling it "50," then subdivide each line above and below equally, and label them "75" and "25" respectively. Each slash mark on the line represents a specific point and the slash immediately above and below it represent equal distances in measured units from that point. Now place a small dot over the year at the appropriately matched, approximated variable entry (called a variable VALUE). To discern the pattern, connect the dots beginning with 1965 and continuing on to 1973. This line should convey some general information about the changes and growth in a particular variable over this time period. (Colored pens will help identify the countries more easily.)

Questions:

1. Describe the major changes in variable rankings on these Middle Eastern nations between 1965 and 1973.
2. Contrast the rankings of Israel and Egypt across all the military related variables.
3. What kinds of general statements could be made about all the countries and their rank consistency or change on selected military variables in eight years?
4. How will Arab and Israeli governmental decision-makers view their own military strength against the enemy?
5. What are the general and specific threats the conflicting parties might perceive from this military picture?
6. Given both rankings and growth patterns of Mid Eastern nations throughout this time, and perceptions the disputing parties have of each other, what future actions might they expect from their opponents?

TABLE VI

Rank Order of Selected Middle East Nations on Some Military Related Variables: 1965 and 1973

Country	Population		GNP/Capita		Mil $/% GNP		Mil $/Capita		Mil $/Forces		Size Forces		Forces by 1000		Arms Imports	
	1965	1973	1965	1973	1965	1973	1965	1973	1965	1973	1965	1973	1965	1973	1965	1973
Israel																
Egypt																
Jordan																
Syria																
Lebanon																
Saudi Arabia																
Iraq																
Iran																



FIGURE 1. Variable: _____



FIGURE 2. Variable: _____

TABLE VII

Gross National Product Per Capita (in constant U.S. dollars)*

Country	Year								
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Israel	1552	1533	1516	1685	1847	1934	2060	2193	2211
Egypt	217	213	206	204	212	219	221	227	–
Jordan	346	348	361	336	357	308	305	291	271
Syria	245	232	236	240	269	265	291	305	310
Lebenon	658	643	591	642	628	633	674	700	726
Saudi Arabia	517	554	598	620	649	682	729	778	861
Iraq	336	342	320	353	356	355	376	371	377
Iran	300	323	349	374	395	423	459	497	566

*The information is given in millions of constant U.S. dollars, using a standard currency value of the constant 1972 U.S. dollar. Included in the figure are current and capital expenditures to meet the needs of the armed forces, expenses of national defense agencies, activities like atomic energy, research and development and para-military forces.

Source: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade: 1963-1973,* Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

TABLE VIII

Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP

Country	Year								
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Israel	8.96	10.64	16.32	17.70	21.35	25.92	23.75	21.62	45.41
Egypt	9.20	7.13	6.67	8.94	9.59	12.96	13.70	14.62	15.06
Jordan	11.86	12.22	13.31	19.46	19.34	16.80	16.77	17.43	16.91
Syria	7.01	6.96	7.07	11.02	9.73	11.77	9.10	12.25	miss
Lebanon	2.48	2.65	3.08	2.87	2.94	2.75	2.52	2.46	miss
Saudi Arabia	5.70	6.29	11.33	6.50	6.88	6.02	6.43	14.67	miss
Iraq	11.36	10.46	10.25	12.34	14.76	13.60	13.44	12.77	miss
Iran	5.48	5.58	6.85	7.44	8.26	8.21	9.41	10.61	11.45

Source: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade: 1963-1973,* Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

TABLE IX

Military Expenditures per Capita in Constant Dollars*

Country	Year								
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Israel	139.08	163.12	247.47	298.28	394.42	501.36	489.26	474.22	1003.90
Egypt	19.96	15.20	13.70	18.21	20.36	28.36	30.26	33.12	miss
Jordan	41.00	42.48	48.09	65.42	69.09	51.81	51.10	50.66	miss
Syria	17.19	16.15	16.71	26.40	26.16	31.15	26.47	37.24	miss
Lebanon	16.28	17.05	18.18	18.42	18.47	17.41	16.96	17.23	miss
Saudi Arabia	29.52	34.80	67.73	40.27	44.64	41.05	46.87	114.06	–
Iran	16.45	18.04	23.89	27.89	32.64	34.69	43.18	52.78	64.82
Iraq	38.11	35.81	32.78	43.51	52.57	48.31	50.56	47.35	miss

*The information is given in millions of constant U.S. dollars, using a standard currency value of the constant 1972 U.S. dollar. Included in the figure are current and capital expenditures to meet the needs of the armed forces, expenses of national defense agencies, activities like atomic energy, research and development and para-military forces.

Source: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade: 1963-1973,* Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

TABLE X

Military Expenditures per Armed Force (in constant U.S. dollars)*

Country	Year								
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Israel	5497	6600	8962	8820	11359	14134	11471	11469	25044
Egypt	2862	2128	1918	2942	2851	3659	3228	2913	miss
Jordan	1442	1697	1654	2536	2538	1685	1850	1760	miss
Syria	1143	1108	1184	2380	2111	2597	1557	2168	miss
Lebanon	2303	2220	2436	2543	2628	2554	2437	2553	miss
Saudi Arabia	3484	3743	6727	3421	3895	3399	3461	8680	miss
Iraq	3380	3280	3100	4249	5300	4764	4662	4517	miss
Iran	2095	2302	3139	3771	4250	4290	5283	6433	7574

*The information is given in millions of constant U.S. dollars, using a standard currency value of the constant 1972 U.S. dollar. Included in the figure are current and capital expenditures to meet the needs of the armed forces, expenses of national defense agencies, activities like atomic energy, research and development and para-military forces.

Source: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade: 1963-1973,* Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

TABLE XI

Country Armed Force Size in Thousands of Persons*

Country	Year								
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Israel	65	65	75	95	100	105	130	130	130
Egypt	205	215	220	195	230	255	315	390	390
Jordan	55	50	60	55	60	70	65	70	70
Syria	80	80	80	65	75	75	110	115	115
Lebanon	17	19	19	19	19	19	20	20	20
Saudi Arabia	40	45	50	60	60	65	75	75	75
Iraq	90	90	90	90	90	95	105	105	105
Iran	205	210	210	210	225	245	255	265	285

*This refers to the total number of military troops—including active duty military personnel, para-military forces, but not reserve forces.

Source: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade: 1963-1973*, Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

TABLE XII

Armed Forces per Thousand Population

Country	Year								
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Israel	25.30	24.70	27.60	33.80	34.70	35.50	42.70	41.40	40.10
Egypt	6.97	7.14	7.14	6.19	7.14	7.75	9.38	11.37	11.11
Jordan	28.44	25.03	29.07	25.80	27.22	30.74	27.62	28.78	27.84
Syria	16.04	14.57	14.11	11.09	12.40	11.99	17.00	17.18	16.61
Lebanon	7.07	7.68	7.46	7.24	7.03	6.82	6.96	6.75	6.54
Saudi Arabia	6.47	9.30	10.07	11.77	11.46	12.08	13.54	13.14	12.75
Iraq	11.28	10.92	10.57	10.24	9.92	10.14	10.84	10.48	10.14
Iran	7.85	7.84	7.61	7.39	7.68	8.09	8.17	8.20	8.56

Source: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade: 1963-1973*, Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

TABLE XIII
Arms Imports in Constant Dollars (by millions)

Country	Year								
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Israel	46	37	23	55	163	232	257	214	1717
Egypt	82	115	204	116	112	656	360	303	480
Jordan	16	23	17	25	72	48	53	48	65
Syria	10	15	58	40	48	61	110	163	724
Lebanon	1	2	0	34	20	4	3	28	12
Saudi Arabia	27	25	47	79	83	26	19	52	69
Iraq	40	35	90	133	69	45	35	85	306
Iran	34	56	104	135	222	160	295	431	455

Source: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade: 1963-1973*, Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

TABLE XIV

Country Populations 1965-1973 (in millions)*

Country	Year								
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Israel	2.57	2.63	2.72	2.80	2.88	2.96	3.05	3.14	3.24
Egypt	29.40	30.10	30.80	31.50	32.20	32.90	33.60	34.30	35.10
Jordan	1.93	1.99	2.06	2.13	2.20	2.28	2.35	2.43	2.51
Syria	5.32	5.49	5.67	5.86	6.05	6.25	6.47	6.69	6.92
Lebanon	2.41	2.47	2.55	2.62	2.70	2.79	2.87	2.96	3.06
Saudi Arabia	4.72	4.84	4.97	5.10	5.24	5.38	5.54	5.71	5.88
Iran	26.10	26.80	27.60	28.40	29.30	30.30	31.20	32.30	33.30
Iraq	7.98	8.24	8.51	8.79	9.07	9.37	9.68	10.02	10.35

*Population estimates are for midyear and are supplied by the International Statistical Program Center, Bureau of the Census, and U.S. Department of Commerce.

THE MIDDLE EAST GAME

Now that you have a background to some factors affecting politics in the Middle East, with additional work in the library—reading news magazines to understand the most recent problems and issues, and consulting various works noted in the bibliography—you should be ready to write a policy paper. In preparing for the Middle East Game you will be assigned a position on one of the game teams.

Policy Papers. The policy paper should address a specific issue that is regarded as an important problem facing the country to which you are assigned. Your task is to prepare a statement on a particular topic representing the point of view of decision-makers in that nation. Part of the assignment means you must be able to empathize with the positions currently taken by policy-makers in the country in order to generate reasonable and viable policies consistent with those positions.

The policy paper begins with a specification of national objectives that form the basis of an acceptable peaceful solution to the topical problems from the list provided below. If desired, other topical areas may be added to this list. A brief outline of two or three alternative strategies representing ways to achieve the goals most effectively, follows. One of these is selected as the policy choice, noting the rationale for deeming it most appropriate to the problem at hand. The remaining portion of the policy paper contains a step by step outline of tactics, strategies and political manipulations that are to be employed as the state decides to enact the policy. Priority given to each problem addressed by a country should be noted.

Each member of a country team should address a different, relevant issue. These papers form the central documents in the Middle East Game and the most important problems facing your assigned country should be confronted. Four-member teams will have four policy papers, each on a separate issue related to problems in the country represented. The papers may be brief (1-3 pages), using the outline form shown. Alternatively, the project may be undertaken as a major research effort.

Suggested Problems

1. Palestinian Refugees
2. PLO recognition and separate Palestinian state
3. Status of the West bank
4. Status of Sinai
5. Status of Golan Heights
6. Status of Jerusalem
7. UN role and presence in the area
8. Guerilla activity and border raids
9. Oil embargo
10. Navigation of Suez Canal
11. Acquisition of military aid
12. Use of the superpowers in Arab-Israeli disputes
13. Arab unity

EXERCISE 5

Policy Paper Outline

Country _____

Problem _____

Priority _____

I. General Position Statement

II. National Objectives

III. Strategies to Achieve Objectives
(list two or three alternatives)

IV. Justification
(why this policy choice)

V. Procedures for Achieving Goals
(give a sequential detailed arrangement of necessary steps)

Those of you given a role on a non-nation team, either the United Nations group, the ROW group or designated as a reporter for the Press, will have writing assignments slightly different from the policy statements required by nation teams. For the purposes of the game, the Palestinians are considered a nation team and will prepare policy papers, although, as in the real world, they are not formally constituted as a nation-state, with territory and the types of relationships afforded recognized bona fide status in the international system.

The writing task for the United Nations team is to construct a listing of ways the UN is currently being used to handle the Middle Eastern conflicts. Are there negotiating teams? What advancements have been made toward peaceful solutions? Is there a specially designated UN envoy to deal with the Arab-Israeli dispute? Are there peacekeeping forces stationed in the area? What is the status of resolutions put before the General Assembly and the Security Council? What is the Secretary-General's position on the role of the organization in Middle Eastern affairs? In preparation for the Middle East Game, the UN group should fully understand the methods available for dealing with the Arab-Israeli dispute. These specific areas are to be addressed in the writing assignment by various team members. The UN paper will represent a collective effort by the team; the entire document consisting of 6-10 pages. The team may be required to complete Exercise 2 on updating roll call data for resolutions too.

The ROW team is responsible for understanding the attitudes taken by major blocs of states towards parties and positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict. While it is impossible to learn quickly the policy of each country towards the Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians, some general overviews may be developed. Specifically, the ROW team should address these questions: (a) What is the policy of the Common Market countries on different aspects of the conflict? (b) What is the position of Japan, of China? (c) How are the policies of the other Arab states consistent with those countries included in the game? ROW should get a grasp of voting records in the United Nations General Assembly by studying the Tables of resolutions and outcomes presented earlier in the module. (This will enable the team to apportion the ballots into yea, nay and abstention categories in the event that General Assembly resolutions come to a vote during the Middle East Game.) ROW must be called into game activity by a request from the national teams. Most often, the matters outlined here form the focal points for ROW reactions. As a team effort, the writing assignment for ROW should span about 6-10 pages.

The Press team is divided into two groups with four or more players assigned to the team, and constitutes two newspapers, the *New York Times* and *Pravda*.

(If there are fewer than four team members, the group may represent the *NYT.*) They are given no explicit writing assignment at this point, but are responsible for glancing through actual copies of the newspaper that they will represent in the game to get an idea about how these papers present the news and construct editorial opinion on matters of the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the game, the members of the press are expected to produce a 2-3 page newspaper after each move period, if the game is conducted every several days, or prepare a simulated television newscast, when the game is played through several hours in one day.

The major goal of the Middle East game is for each team to enact successfully all position statements generated in their policy papers. *It is assumed that these policies are realistic representations* of those held by the actual nations who are parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Teams. The players are divided into teams, each containing two to four members. A list of teams includes:

1. Israel
2. Egypt
3. Jordan
4. Syria
5. Lebanon*
6. Saudi Arabia*
7. Iraq*
8. Iran*
9. United States
10. Soviet Union
11. United Kingdom*
12. France*
13. Palestinians
14. United Nations
15. Rest of the World (ROW)
16. Press

*May be excluded if the total number of players is small.

The Middle East simulation may be played by as few as 18 participants, or as many as 70. Each individual assigned to a *country* team will be allocated a particular decision-making role. These roles are:

COUNTRY TEAMS

The Head of State who has final authority in all policy decisions set forth by the country team. Concern with developing long range policies, planning short range strategies consonant with these policies, and selecting appropriate means to carry out programs form the major tasks for the Head of State. The delegation of specific tasks to other team members is also the responsibility of the Head of State.

Foreign Policy Strategists fulfill the duties of a secretary of state and an ambassador. It is their responsibility to assist the Head of State in the overall planning of relations with other countries in the simulation. These individuals conduct all regular negotiations with other states.

The Press Secretary is responsible for keeping state records established during the simulation. These include the policy paper documents, a log of activities evolving during the game play, notes from international conferences and the like. Conveying information to the press is also the responsibility of the press secretary.

NON-COUNTRY UNITS

The United Nations Team represents the roles that may be taken by the UN as that body becomes a participant in the simulated politics of the Middle East. The position of a mediator, the office of Secretary-General, or president of the General Assembly or Security Council may be assumed by UN team members if any or all of these varied roles of the UN are called for by states represented in the game.

The ROW (Rest of the World) Team is composed of players who represent all nations not directly included in the game. Their responsibility is to react to requests by participating states in the game, and to provide information from the outside world perspective on events occurring during play. ROW may symbolize any specific nation or groups of nations, for example, the other Arab bloc states, all remaining UN member states, Common Market states. As with the UN team, ROW must be called into play by a country team.

The Press Team is assigned the role of collecting all information evolving during the game and assembling it into newspaper form (or, perhaps a television or radio report). Such information includes events, opinions and reactions of states to activities on the international scene. The reporters are responsible for preparing the newspaper(s) daily which describe the game action in some detail. When there are two newspapers, the *New York Times* and *Pravda,* differing interpretations of the events are given that reflect the policies of these papers. One player is assigned as chief editor for each newspaper, but all team members function as reporters. The Press team may initiate contact with any game participant at all times once play has begun. Such activity should include reports of observed events, allegations made by countries, interviews and the like.

A Director serves as the center of game activity by directing the control center. All decisions and moves taken by the teams during the game must be reported to the director at the conclusion of each move period. Control is responsible for interpreting game rules, evaluating and determining whether proposed moves by various nations may be permitted, judging war outcomes, delivering country messages and generally assuring that the game runs smoothly.

Sequence of Play. The game is divided into a set of move periods that may span 30 to 60 minutes each. There should be some break between these periods (say, a minimum of 15 minutes if the game is run entirely in a single day, or separated by class meeting days if it is conducted over a week or more). There is no

minimum number of move periods *required.* At least four move periods are recommended, however. Six to ten periods may be desirable.

During each move period the country teams meet to decide the problems to be addressed and various strategies that will be employed. The time needed by states for these conferences will differ; some country teams may require five minutes, others will use more time—15 to 20 minutes. Once the plans for that move period are laid out, foreign policy negotiators are free to set up international meetings with negotiators of other states. During this time UN Assembly or Security Council sessions may be called. The bulk of the move period focuses on the international contact. At the close of the period, country teams gather to confer about the activities and formulate a move statement (a form for this purpose is contained at the end of the rules). These moves, or national decisions, are sent to the control center for approval, and if accepted, they are passed on to the Journalism staff. The reporters proceed to construct a newspaper from the events of the latest move period. It is distributed at the start of the next move, as countries form their strategy sessions. The sequence of activities in the Middle East simulation may be diagramed as follows:

Newspaper Distribution or Telecast
↓
Country Strategy Session
↓
International Conferences
↓
Country Session: Form Move
↓
Move Submitted to Control
↓
Move Submitted to Press
↓
Press Constructs News Analysis

EXERCISE 6

Starting the Game. There is no newspaper preceding the first move period. Participants enter the simulation-game and form immediately into their country teams, or non-nation groups to which they have been assigned. From the policy papers that were prepared in advance of the game, a course of action for the period is developed. Deciding to negotiate with other parties, or to request UN meetings, or to begin battle plans, are examples of the decisions made during these planning sessions. At the start of each subsequent move, the players have the opportunity to digest an analysis of the previous period's events that will assist them in future policy plans.

Rules.

1. All forms of interaction across states must be initiated through written communications, to be delivered by control to the Head of State of the recipient country.
2. Receipt of all written messages must be acknowledged in writing, if they are to be answered.
3. Oral conferences between states will be conducted in designated Negotiation Centers by the state strategists. These meetings may not take place in the national decision-making areas.
4. The game is set in the present; all actual events in the Middle East occurring immediately prior to the game should be taken into account at the onset of play. However, once the simulation begins, activities outside the game environment are no longer relevant.
5. Simulated states move in the game by drafting and executing move statements. A move statement is a written description of a course of action undertaken during a move-period time. (A move form is included in the Appendix.) Each activity involving any interaction with another state(s) must be recorded on the move form. Examples of moves include: formation of military alliances with other states, foreign aid agreements consummated, mobilization of national military forces, peace talks on the refugee problem, requesting a meeting in the United Nations, discussions with a United Nations mediator, raids by guerilla troops, reaffirmation of policy positions previously established.
6. Each move by a state must be recorded on a separate move form and forwarded to the Simulation Director at the time it is completed.
7. Simulated states will make at least one move during each move period of the simulation; there is no upper restriction on the quantity of moves completed per country.
8. Moves may be forwarded to the Simulation Director at any point during game play.
9. Moves may be public or confidential, subjected, of course, to realistic appraisals. A statement of justification must accompany all decisions which the country designates as classified material.
10. A move statement saying that a nation intends no action is a valid move, that is, it is not necessary to undertake activities on the international scene daily, though this will depend on events occurring during the game.
11. All moves will be prepared in duplicate, one of which will be sent to the Director at the Control Center (and passed on to the Press in the absence of confidential information, otherwise retained at Control); the other is to be filed with the collection of materials held by the country team.

12. Moves must be signed by the Head of State, although any team member may submit move statements to the Control Center. The signature in all cases indicates approval of the intended decisions.

13. Any proposed move involving massive mobilization of domestic resources, military action towards enemy states, and implementation of a policy which necessitates mobilization, movement of troops or material of one's own state to a foreign country, will be subjected to a probability calculus to determine whether the decision can be implemented during the game given conditions of the country and the world.

14. Such decisions will be ranked along a routine to extreme scale, which in all cases, will be determined solely by the Director. It is important to remember that the probability of success granted one action may differ from country to country depending on foreign policy activity commonly undertaken by a state. (For example, guerilla actions against Israel, while not unusual for a Palestinian team, might be highly unrealistic for the Americans in this context.) Implementation of relatively routine events may have greater likelihood of success than non-routine or drastic measures introduced by a nation. In order to keep the flow of events of the game within realistic, practical boundaries, while allowing proposals reflecting extreme or unusual actions to be considered within game activity, a chance factor is incorporated. The source of risk as conceptualized here is not identical to that of the real world; nonetheless, chance does operate in actual foreign policy choice and the way it is incorporated into this exercise is functionally similar. The table below lists decision categories and accompanying probabilities for success.

15. If a nation draws a "failure" card, the proposed action may not be implemented, at least at that time. The failure of the act will be noted on the move statement and filed with control.

TABLE XV

Probability of Success for National Decisions Formulated by States*

Nature of Decision	Probability of Success
Routine	100%
Moderately routine	80%
Serious, non-routine	60%
Moderately extreme, drastic	40%
Extreme	20%
Unrealistic	0%

*This feature is handled in the game by constructing a pile of probability cards composed of four decks, each containing ten cards. One deck refers to decisions classified as "moderately routine" and labeled as such, with the reverse containing the word "success" on eight cards, and "failure" on two. Another deck refers to the "serious, non-routine" decisions, in which six and four cards respectively are labeled success and failure, and so on.

16. The same move may be submitted during any *subsequent* move period, but after two more failures, it may not be brought to Control anymore as a proposed move.

17. Failed moves will not be reported to the Press by Control. The initiator state is free, however, to discuss such events with reporters.

18. If the states desire to call the United Nations into sessions, such a request must be made on the move statement and forwarded to Control. *The session may then be held during any specified subsequent move period during class time.*

19. The actual organization of the United Nations session can be determined by the requesting party or parties. That is, a meeting with the Secretary General, or General Assembly or Security Council sessions must be so noted on the move form. In the case of large session meetings, the ROW team will be called in to participate in the proceedings.

20. States may request as many UN sessions as desired, and these meetings can be regularly instituted into the game if the participants so wish.

21. Rules governing the procedures for UN meetings will follow actual session practices of this international body and will be directed by the UN representative in the game.

22. Conduct of international conflicts during the simulation are organized into two phases: battle and outcome of the dispute.

23. If countries are contemplating war some time in the game, basic information about military capabilities of Middle Eastern nations will be necessary. Reliable statistics for all countries are hard to find, but generally, THE MILITARY BALANCE (published annually by Institute for Strategic

TABLE XVI

Military Capability Summary

Year _____

Country	Size of Army	No. of Tanks	Size of Air Force	No. of Combat Aircraft
Israel				
Egypt				
Jordan				
Syria				
Lebanon				
Saudi Arabia				
Libya				
Iraq				
Iran				

Studies, London) contains fairly good data. Current troop and equipment strengths for each nation may be entered on the military summary sheet shown below. (Note: The instructor could provide these materials to all players prior to the game.)

24. If a nation intends to attack another nation, the Military Attack form (see Appendix) is completed in duplicate with one copy submitted to Control no later than 15 minutes before the close of the playing period.

25. The attacked country will be informed immediately by the Director, who specifies the geographic area, number of square miles involved and the approximate location. The attacking country is identified although the precise extent of the strike in military strength is not revealed.

26. The attacked party is given the opportunity to respond, including the launch of a retaliatory attack. For this purpose, a Military Attack form will need to be forwarded to control.

27. All battles are considered single bilateral exchanges; a country strikes once at another state and the targeted country strikes back once. Forces of several countries may not be combined for a battle on an enemy state, although several states may attack one country during the same move period.

28. The outcome of a military engagement will be determined battle by battle according to an aggregate strength factor combining troops and weapons for each side. Although simplifying, all combat aircraft are regarded equal in strength, as are tanks, for all sides. To determine military strength in any battle, these further equivalencies apply: 1 combat aircraft = 3 tanks = 15 troops. Only Army and Air Force troops and weaponry play a role in game warfare.

29. For a single battle, countries may commit up to 10% of their total combat machinery, e.g. 10% each of tanks and aircraft. Troop strength not greater than 1% may be committed.

30. Israeli troop and weapon strengths are given a slight edge over Arab nations' capabilities. Due to organization and mobilization efficiency that the country has demonstrated in previous wars, Israeli capability is determined by multiplying its total actual strength by 1.2. For example, 2050 actual tanks = 2460 Game Tanks. (2050 x 1.2 = 2460), and up to 246 tanks (10% could be used in a battle.

31. The party initiating an attack stands to gain land area adjacent to its borders within the specifications given on the Military Attack form, if it commits a greater show of strength than its opponent. Put another way, the defensive country, responding to an attack, will lose portions of the disputed land if it sends a smaller military force to battle.

32. An attacking party committing lesser forces will not lose territory and likewise, the defensive country, if it commits the greater amount of military capability, will retain the land specified as the battle arena.

33. Exact gains and losses for the parties will be determined by the Director according to the ratio of total forces committed for each country and the proportionate military losses and territorial changes accompanying separate ratios in the War Outcome Table shown here:

TABLE XVII

War Outcome Table

Side Committing Greater Forces				Side Committing Lesser Forces		
Approximate Ratio	Military Loss %	Land Gains %		Military Loss %	Land Gains %	
		Attack	Defend		Attack	Defend
1:1	–20	+20	0	–20	0	–20
3:2	–20	+30	0	–30	0	–30
2:1	–20	+40	0	–40	0	–40
5:2	–10	+50	0	–50	0	–50
3:1	–10	+60	0	–60	0	–60
7:2	– 5	+70	0	–70	0	–70
4:1	0	+all	0	–80	0	–all

Interpreting this table: If Egypt attacks Israel in the Sinai, say 100 square miles, with 200 tanks (less than 10% of total tank strength) and 3000 troops (representing less than 1% of troop strength) and Israel retaliates with 250 tanks and 3500 men (the 1.2 edge already computed), then the aggregate strength factors are: Egypt: 200 + (3000 ÷ 15) = 400; Israel: 250 + (3500 ÷ 15) = 484; and an approximate 1:1 ratio obtains. The greater forces are committed by the defending state. Both sides lose 20% of military strength used in battle, resulting in 80 aggregate units lost for Egypt, and 97 such units taken from Israel. These units translate back to tanks and troops directly: for Egypt, 40 tanks plus 600 men are sacrificed, Israel gives 50 tanks and 700 men. No land is lost (or, therefore gained) in this example. Had Egyptians struck with greater force, they would have acquired 20 square miles (20% of 100) of Sinai which borders on Egypt's territory, meaning Israeli holdings in Sinai are reduced by 20 square miles. The precise shape of acquired land is decided by the Director.

34. War outcome results will be recorded on the Military Attack forms by the Director and reported to the disputing parties prior to the onset of the next move period.

35. In the following move period, it is up to the contending parties to decide whether they wish to terminate the conflict, seek mediation of a third party or continue the conflict by launching further attacks—in which case the parties may attack once during every move period until the game ends.

MILITARY ATTACK FORM

SENDER: _____ MOVE PERIOD: _____

TARGET: _____ TIME: _____

1. TERRITORY LOCATION: _____

2. SQUARE MILES: _____

3. TROOPS COMMITTED: _____% _____ (raw figure)

4. WEAPONS COMMITTED: _____% _____ (raw figure)

5. ATTACKING or DEFENDING

BATTLE OUTCOMES COMPLETED BY THE DIRECTOR

Ratio _____

SIDE COMMITTING GREATER FORCES IS: _____

MILITARY LOSS IS _____% OR _____ TROOPS PLUS _____ WEAPONS.

PARTY WAS ATTACKING/DEFENDING TERRITORY RESULTING IN _____ MILES GAINED/RETAINED.

IF ATTACKING PARTY COMMITTED GREATER FORCES; THE PRECISE LOCATION

OF TERRITORY ACQUIRED: _____

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MOVE FORM

COUNTRY: _____ MOVE PERIOD: _____

1. SUBJECT: _____

2. DECISION:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

3. REASON FOR CHOICE:

_____

_____

_____

4. OTHER STATES: _____

5. TOP SECRET: yes no

6. PROBABILITY FACTOR REQUIRED: yes no

(Completed by Director): Likelihood _____% Outcome: Success Failure

_____

Head of State

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EVALUATING POLICY

Now that you have experienced aspects of the decisional process and dealt with the constraints and frustrations affecting governmental leaders as they attempt to enact policies designed to meet national objectives, we will review and evaluate these policies as they unfolded in the politics of the Middle East Game.

There are a number of political problems in the Middle East today that you have read about, analyzed, addressed as topics in the policy papers, and finally, tried to work out in the game context. Which of these problems did your country deem most critical in leading towards peace? Which problems did your state emphasize during the game? What issues seemed to dominate game activity? In the questionnaire provided: (Exercise 7)

a. Rank order the problem areas from the list of issues suggested as policy paper topics, in terms of their salience in the game as a whole. That is, place the problem areas in rank order on the basis of how important they were to everyone in the game.

b. Rank order the problem areas in terms of their salience to your team at the very beginning of the simulation. That is, place the problem areas in rank order on the basis of how important you expected each problem to be to your team when the simulation began. You should take into account your team's policy papers in making your rank order list.

c. Rank order the problem areas in terms of their salience to your team in the simulation. That is, place the problem areas in rank order on the basis of how important each problem actually was to your team and how much time and effort your team expended in treating each problem.

Questions:

1. How and why did the "expected salience" ranks differ from the "actual salience" ranks? (Be sure to detail the internal (i.e., inside your team) and the external (i.e., outside your team), reasons for any differences.)
2. How and why did the "game salience" ranks differ from the "actual salience" ranks?
3. What were the major obstacles to achieving objectives specified in team policy papers?

4. How was your team influenced by policies advocated by others?
5. What processes characterized the way your team arrived at decisions? Which decision-model, among those noted earlier, would best predict team behavior?
6. Given your experience in this political game, how would you describe the relative strengths and weaknesses of various decision-process models with respect to their general applicability in "real world" foreign policy making?
7. Game participation offers players the opportunity to understand political processes, yet the gaming environment does not replicate the real world. How did the Middle East Game provide you with a realistic understanding of decision-maker perceptions and foreign policy choices?
8. Given the role you played in the game, did your perceptions and attitudes about other nations in the Middle East affect your policies?

Exercise 7

ISSUES EMPHASIZED IN THE MIDDLE EAST GAME

Team _____

Issue Area	Game Salience	Expected Salience Your Team	Actual Salience Your Team
1. _____			
2. _____			
3. _____			
4. _____			
5. _____			
6. _____			
7. _____			
8. _____			
9. _____			
10. _____			
11. _____			
12. _____			
13. _____			
14. _____			
15. _____			

9. What is your perception of winning in this game? What does winning mean in international politics?

10. Were you influenced personally by this experience in your attitudes about the Arab-Israeli conflict, policies of particular states and prospects for peace in the Middle East?

11. Formulate a few simple hypotheses about decision-makers' perceptions, events, and foreign policy. From the Middle East Game, what systematic evidence could be gathered to support or refute your statements?

H_1 _____

_____

Data: _____

_____

H_2 _____

_____

Data: _____

_____

CODEBOOK

Blechman Codebook

Variable 1: COUNTRY ACTOR

Codes:
- 0 Unknown, unspecified
- 1 Israel
- 2 Egypt
- 3 Jordan
- 4 Syria
- 5 Lebanon
- 6 Iraq
- 7 Other

Variable 2: COUNTRY TARGET

Codes:
- 0 Unknown, unspecified
- 1 Israel
- 2 Egypt
- 3 Jordan
- 4 Syria
- 5 Lebanon
- 6 Iraq
- 7 Other

Variable 3: ACTION TYPE

Codes:
- 01 Yield (e.g., surrender, yield position)
- 02 Comment (e.g., explain policy, comment)
- 03 Consult (e.g., receive visit, visit, meet)
- 04 Approve (praise, applaud, endorse)
- 05 Promise (assure, promise)
- 06 Grant (grant privilege, apologize)
- 07 Reward (extend aid or assistance)
- 08 Agree (substantive agreement, agree to further action)
- 09 Request (request information, action, appeal)

10 Propose (offer proposal, urge course of action)
11 Reject (refuse, oppose, turn down proposal)
12 Accuse (charge, criticize, blame, denounce)
13 Protest (make complaint, protest)
14 Deny (deny an accusation or attributed role)
15 Demand (insist, issue order or command)
16 Warn (give warning)
17 Threaten (threaten, issue ultimatum)
18 Demonstrate (walk out of, mobilize, maneuver)
19 Reduce relationship (cancel plans, halt negotiations)
20 Expel (order personnel, organization out of country)
21 Seize (detain or arrest person, seize position)
22 Force (any event involving violence)

Variable 4: ARENA

Codes:
0 Unknown
1 Palestinian Refugees
2 Jordan River Dispute
3 Suez Canal, Gulf of Aqaba blockade, Arab econ., diplomatic boycotts
4 Territorial issues, demilitarized zones, border demarcation
5 Jerusalem, Holy Places, treatment of minorities
6 Border incidents, fighting, wars, casualties (other than those related to above themes)
7 Peace proposals
8 General conflict (unrelated to above themes)

Variable 5: YEAR

Codes:
65 1965
66 1966
67 1967
68 1968
69 1969

Variable 6: RELIABILITY

Codes:
1 Reported as fact
2 Attributed to neutral sources
3 Reported by target and not denied by actor
4 Reported by actor and not denied by target
5 Reported by actor or target, denied by other

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Background Information on Middle East Countries

The Middle East and North Africa Annual Encyclopedia Yearbook provides a good background to each of the countries. Various *Army Area Handbooks* on individual countries are helpful on military, political, geographic details. *The Journal of Palestine Studies,* a quarterly on Palestinian affairs and the Arab-Israeli conflict, beginning in August, 1971, offers update materials on various aspects of the conflict. *Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century* (Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine, eds.), published in 1972 gives a brief account of conflict issues, important personalities, political movements. *The Middle East: Handbook* edited by Michael Adams, contains profiles on all the countries with regard to geography, population, recent history, political affairs.

II. International Politics and the Middle East

Two Adelphi Papers, prepared by the Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Middle East and the International System: The Impact of the 1973 War, The Middle East and the International System: Security and Energy Policy,* issued in Spring, 1975, give a general picture of future directions, international viewpoints and highlighted issues. Elizabeth Monroe and A. H. Farrar-Hockley have co-authored another paper in this series entitled *The Arab-Israel War, October 1973 Background and Events* (Winter 1974/75) discussing issues, military strategy surrounding the most recent conflict. Articles in *The Political Dynamics in the Middle East* (Paul Hammond and Sidney A. Alexander, eds., 1972) present overviews on internal workings of individual states, interstate relations within the region, the role of outside powers, and issue treatment including separate analyses on each country participant in the Arab-Israeli conflict. *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma,* by Fred Khouri (1968) gives balanced consideration to issues, noting prospects, problems for peace. Analysis by the American Friends, *Search for Peace in the Middle East* (1970) provides a brief historical account of conflict events.

III. Perceptions, Foreign Policy and Gaming

Studies on perception often focus on international crisis, several hundred hypotheses are listed in *International Crisis: Insights from Behavioral Research,* edited by Charles Hermann (1972). Ole Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation and War* (1972) summarizes many analyses of World War I outbreak and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Raymond Tanter in *Modelling and Managing International Conflicts* (1974) brings together perceptions and actions surrounding Eastern, Western alliances in the Berlin Crises. *Journal of International Affairs* (Vol. XXI No. 1, 1967), published separately as *Images and Realities in World Politics,* John Farrell and Asa Smith, editors, has topical pieces focusing on perception, misperception, reality-testing components. Two helpful books on gaming are: Harold Guetzkow, *Simulation in Social Science* (1962) and John Raser, *Simulation and Society,* 1969. *American Behavioral Scientist,* XX, 1 (1976) is devoted to individual, group perspectives in political decision-making, a special issue edited by Samuel Kirkpatrick.